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FULLY DEVELOPED AND COMPREHENSIVE SET OF 
STATUTORY DEFAULT LEGAL RULES 
 
JACK M. GRAVES* 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
This Article analyzes the United States Federal Arbitration Act, as a 
statutory framework for effective arbitration of contract disputes. While 
arbitration under this Act has been subject to ever increasing criticism 
and calls for reform on a variety of fronts—most often from the 
perspective of consumer or employment arbitration—this Article focuses 
specifically on commercial, business-to-business arbitration and critically 
evaluates the Act as a set of default legal rules governing arbitration as a 
unique contractual business relationship. 
The Article first looks at arbitration from a contractual default rules 
perspective and then employs this perspective to analyze: (1) the existing 
federal statutory scheme; (2) the developing body of federal “common 
law” governing arbitration; (3) the potential impact of state legislation 
governing arbitration; and (4) the use of private rules to govern 
arbitration. Finally, the Article looks at the related doctrines of 
“competence-competence” and separability under U.S. law, specifically 
focusing on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, 
Inc. v. Jackson. The Article ultimately concludes with a call for an entirely 
new federal statute governing both domestic and international commercial 
business-to-business arbitration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The basic idea of arbitration is deceptively simple. Two or more 
persons choose to resolve their disputes privately, thereby foregoing 
traditional court adjudication. Upon closer examination, of course, we 
discover that this simple theoretical construct often raises a variety of 
challenging and complex issues in its practical application.1 In some cases, 
these issues may be resolved by reference to the parties’ arbitration 
agreement, which may include a designated arbitral institution or a set of 
specified rules for conducting the arbitration. In many other cases, 
however, the parties must look for answers within the applicable legal 
framework governing their arbitration agreement. 
In the United States, arbitration is largely governed by the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).2 The FAA governs both domestic3 and 
international4 arbitration, though it may, under certain circumstances, give 
way to or be supplemented by state laws governing arbitration.5 In the 
case of international commercial arbitration, the FAA also incorporates 
either the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)6 or the Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama 
Convention).7 This broad legal frame-work—as a default source of the 
parties’ rights and obligations under domestic and international 
agreements to arbitrate commercial, business-to-business disputes—serves 
as the focus of the Article. 
                                                 
1 For example, who decides if the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute; how many 
arbitrators are required; what happens if one of the parties refuses to cooperate; how 
much discovery is allowed; what sort of hearing procedures are appropriate; and to what 
extent the arbitrator’s award is subject to any sort of judicial review? 
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006). 
3 Id. §§ 1-16 (2006). 
4 Id. §§ 201-307 (2006). 
5 The requirements for choosing state arbitration law are not entirely clear. See 
generally George A. Bermann, Ascertaining the Parties’ Intentions in Arbitral Design, 
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1013 (2009) (discussing the application of “generic” choice of law 
clauses, the scope of a state’s arbitration laws, and the interplay between federal and state 
arbitration law). The extent to which the FAA preempts state law remains open to 
significant unresolved questions. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act 
Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 407-09 (2004) [hereinafter Drahozal, FAA Preemeption]. 
Each of these issues is explored more fully. See infra Part II.C. 
6 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
7 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 
14 I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Panama Convention]. 
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As a prelude to an examination of the legal framework governing 
arbitration, it is worth considering briefly the nature of arbitration from a 
few distinctive possible viewpoints. Arbitration, like the proverbial 
“Elephant” examined by the “Blind Men,”8 is many different things to 
different people—depending on one’s perspective or the lens through 
which it is examined. 
For example, many critics focus on arbitration as a waiver of 
fundamental rights, often accomplished with largely unread form 
contracts.9 One might reasonably ask whether arbitration should be highly 
regulated by mandatory rules, lest stronger parties take undue advantage 
of weaker parties. In fact, one might further ask whether ex-ante 
agreements between such parties should be enforced at all.10 
Another lens through which one might view arbitration is that of a 
binding dispute resolution “procedure.” From this perspective, arbitration 
is simply a variation on existing court procedures available for the binding 
resolution of private disputes—one with private judges, perhaps fewer 
formalities, and less post-decisional review, but nonetheless a binding 
dispute resolution procedure that in many ways resembles court 
adjudication. 
From a slightly different perspective, one might view arbitration, not 
by way of comparison to any sort of public adjudication, but instead, as 
one of many alternatives to such binding adjudication commonly 
described as alternative dispute resolution or ADR. From this perspective 
                                                 
8 See JOHN GODFREY SAXE, The Blind Men and the Elephant, in THE POEMS OF JOHN 
GODFREY SAXE 135 (J.R. Osgood ed., 1873). The parable of the blind men and the 
elephant has also been attributed to the Buddha. See also JOSEPH MORRISSEY & JACK 
GRAVES, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW AND ARBITRATION, 299-300 (2008) (employing 
this analogy to introduce the law and practice of arbitration). Professor Park has used this 
same analogy in reference to arbitration, albeit for the purpose of drawing somewhat 
different distinctions. See William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: 
The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 1241, 1242 n.1 (2003) [hereinafter 
Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration]; WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 222 n.1 (2006). In each case, Professor Park points 
out a broad variety of legal disputes that might be resolved through arbitration. 
9 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An 
Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 211-12 & nn.2-4 (2000). 
10 Several scholars have touched on this question. See generally Richard A. Bales & 
Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1081 (2009) (noting that scholars “have not shared the Supreme 
Court’s endorsement of compulsory arbitration”); JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, Consumer 
Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127 (2006); 
Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of 
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. 
REV. 449 (1996). 
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one might, for example, consider the differences between binding 
arbitration and voluntary mediation, conciliation, or other forms of 
assisted settlement. 
From an international or transnational perspective, arbitration takes on 
additional benefits and challenges. Parties from different legal cultures, as 
well as private and state entities, often particularly prefer the sort of 
neutral forum provided by arbitration, and arbitral awards are generally 
easier to enforce across national borders.11 However, various national laws 
governing arbitration may differ in ways that affect the nature of the 
arbitral process. Lastly, one might view arbitration as a matter of 
contract—examining arbitration agreements as fully independent and 
separable consensual agreements, even when contained within broader 
agreements for goods, services, or other contractual rights and obligations. 
Each of these perspectives is of course instructive, and a full 
understanding of arbitration requires some level of understanding of all of 
them (just as a full understanding of the proverbial elephant requires an 
understanding of all of its parts). This Article will focus on arbitration as 
contract—not because this perspective is any more important than any 
other, generally, but because it provides particularly useful insights in 
evaluating the current state of United States law governing commercial 
arbitration and potential proposals for its improvement. Specifically, this 
Article will focus on commercial, business-to-business arbitration and 
examine the effectiveness of the existing American legal framework 
governing arbitration agreements as a unique form of contract. 
While others have explored the contractual nature of commercial 
arbitration, such explorations typically focus on the broad autonomy 
granted to parties in structuring the private dispute resolution 
mechanism.12 Somewhat less has been written about the law governing 
commercial arbitration as a set of contractual default rules,13 and even less 
                                                 
11 William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural 
Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 656-57 (1989). 
12 See generally Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract 
Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39 (1999) (noting that parties add “customized 
features” to arbitration agreements); Thomas Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract 
Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189 
(2003) (explaining that freedom of contract is embodied in arbitration agreements); 
Thomas Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383 (2009) (noting the need for “real choice” in arbitration 
agreements). 
13 Much of the literature instead focuses on the tension between broad party autonomy 
and various proposals of mandatory rules for the protection of consumers and employees 
in arbitration, and the literature addressing default rules has tended to work around the 
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has been written on the need for a singular, comprehensive and systematic 
treatment of both domestic and international commercial arbitration.14 
Originally enacted in 1925, the “venerable” FAA has been subject to 
increasingly frequent critiques and calls for amendment. As suggested 
above, many of these critiques argue for greater protection of perceived 
“weaker” parties, such as consumers and employees, and propose either 
stronger mandatory legal rules protecting such parties or the complete 
exclusion of these parties from the effects of ex-ante arbitration 
agreements.15 The FAA has also been subject to critiques and calls for 
                                                                                                                         
edges of current federal law, as reflected in the Federal Arbitration Act. See generally 
EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
(2006) (noting the need for a reformulation of federal arbitration law). 
14 See, e.g., Jack J. Coe, The Case for the UNCITRAL Model—An Introduction, 4 
INT’L ARB. NEWS 2, 2-4 (2004); Daniel M. Kolkey, Reflections on the U.S. Statutory 
Framework for International Commercial Arbitrations: Its Scope, Its Shortcomings, and 
the Advantages of U.S. Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
491, 534 (1990) (calling for revision or replacement of the FAA, but limiting focus to 
international commercial arbitration); see also James M. Gaitis, The Federal Arbitration 
Act: Risks and Incongruities Relating to the Issuance of Interim and Partial Awards in 
Domestic and International Arbitrations, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 3-5 (2005) (calling 
for replacement of the FAA, but focusing specifically on interim and partial awards). 
15 See, e.g., Margaret Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge? 40 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 147, 189 (2010); Margaret Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535,  
548 (2005). Under most national legal systems, pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
involving consumers, employees, and other highly regulated contractual relationships are 
invalid and unenforceable. See Margaret Moses, Privatized “Justice”, supra; Christopher 
R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration in the United 
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 233, 253 (2006) [hereinafter Drahozal, New Experiences 
of International Commercial Arbitration]. There is currently legislation before both 
houses of Congress that would achieve a similar result under United States law—
rendering pre-dispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable with respect to 
employees, consumers, franchisees, civil rights claimants, and other parties whose 
transactions are statutorily regulated based on unequal bargaining power. S. 931, 111th 
Cong. (2009); H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). The prospects for passage of the foregoing 
are uncertain at this time. Congress has, however, recently passed the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), 
which provides for regulatory oversight and potential restriction of arbitration of financial 
disputes involving consumers. See Karen Halverson Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide 
Unconscionability Challenges, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552966. In one respect, the elimination of ex ante 
arbitration agreements involving consumers, employees, and other protected parties—
which raise a whole host of unique issues—might very well make it much easier to 
address the inadequacy of the FAA, as related to commercial, business-to-business 
arbitration. It is often observed that one of the most significant challenges in amending 
the FAA is the fear of opening the proverbial “Pandora’s box” of special interests, 
particularly those involving consumer and employment arbitration. Park, The Specificity 
of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1295; see also Drahozal, FAA Preemption, 
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amendment to correct a variety of other deficiencies.16 The problems 
presented by the FAA are perceived by many to be particularly acute in 
the context of international transactions, leading to calls for a variety of 
potential solutions, including amendment,17 a new “restatement” of 
existing common law,18 and even a completely new statute specifically 
governing international commercial arbitration.19 However, there have 
been very few, if any, thorough examinations of the potential value of a 
comprehensive new statute governing both domestic and international 
commercial arbitration.20 This Article attempts to fill that void. The 
objective of this Article is to explore more fully the idea of commercial, 
business-to-business arbitration,21 not simply as a contract subject to 
                                                                                                                         
supra note 5, at 235. With these concerns removed, it may be easier to address more 
basic business concerns regarding the existing legal structure. See Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The New Litigation, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 1, 57 (2010) (explaining 
that an understanding of key contextual differences between business-to-business 
transactions, as compared to consumer and employee transactions, is essential to 
lawmakers); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 
10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 417-18 (2009) (noting the “maul[ing]” of U.S. 
domestic arbitration by the “claws of politicalization”). However, depending on the final 
structure of any amendment addressing consumer or employment arbitration, important 
elements of business-to-business, commercial arbitration might be adversely affected. See 
generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, “Arbitracide”: The Story of Anti-Arbitration 
Sentiment in the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 233 (2007); Edna Sussman, The 
Arbitration Fairness Act: Unintended Consequences Threaten U.S. Business, 18 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 455 (2007) (addressing similar legislation to the current legislation cited 
above). The comprehensive approach to new legislation ultimately suggested by this 
article would, however, avoid such unintended spillover from any efforts to amend the 
current statute. 
16 See Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration 
System: Choice and Preemption, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT 63-87 (2006). 
17 See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1242-43. 
18 George A. Bermann, et al., Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial 
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1333 (2009) (outlining the purpose, scope, and 
drafting process of the Third Restatement on International Commercial Arbitration). 
19 See Coe, supra note 14, at 2-4. 
20 For two excellent examples of recent national legislation governing both domestic 
and international commercial arbitration, one might consider the United Kingdom’s 
Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
1996/23/contents (demonstrating a statute with a common law heritage), or Germany’s 
Arbitration Act, Schiedsverfahrensrecht [Arbitration Act], Jan. 1, 1998 (Ger.), available 
at http://www.dis-arb.de/materialien (showing a statute with a civil law heritage). 
21 This Article will address both domestic and international commercial arbitration, 
but will exclude arbitration of consumer and employment agreements, each of which 
present various issues that differ significantly from those faced in commercial, business-
to-business arbitration. 
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autonomous ordering, limited by any appropriate mandatory legal rules, 
but as a sufficiently unique and important genus of contract to justify a 
specific, comprehensive, and systematic legal regime, complete with a 
fully developed set of default legal provisions. 
This Article begins, in Part I, by examining the specific potential for 
incomplete commercial agreements to arbitrate disputes and the 
application of various theories of default rules to these incomplete 
agreements. Under the vast majority of legal regimes governing 
arbitration, including the FAA, a simple agreement to final and binding 
arbitration of commercial disputes is fully enforceable—even if the 
agreement says little, if anything, else about the process of dispute 
resolution.22 Thus, an agreement to arbitrate presents a number of classic 
issues in providing for default rules, as well as some particularized issues 
based on the nature of an arbitration agreement. These issues are further 
analyzed in terms of the theory of nominate contracts and analogized to 
the manner in which American law treats agreements for the sale of 
goods23 and partnership agreements24—albeit by reference to uniform state 
law rather than a federal statute.25 In considering these issues, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
(UNCITRAL Model Law)26 provides a useful point of comparative 
reference, as a comprehensive statutory scheme providing a broad array of 
default rules governing arbitration. 
                                                 
22 An arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity of the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 
(2006). 
23 See generally U.C.C. art. 2 (superseded 2003). 
24 See generally UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997). 
25 This distinction is more fully discussed infra, Part II. 
26 Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade 
Law, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, annex I, at 81-93 (June 
21, 1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. This model law has been adopted, in 
substance, by over fifty countries and six U.S. states. See Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL: U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/encitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.h
tml (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law]. For a 
discussion of the effect of U.S. state adoptions see infra Part II.C.3 on the law governing 
international commercial arbitration. At least one country, Germany, has also adopted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law to govern domestic arbitration as well. Dr. Stefan Kröll, 
Germany, in III INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1, 1 (Albert 
Jan van den Berg ed., 2007). The UNCITRAL Model Law was amended in 2006 to 
modernize the writing requirement (art. 7) and add a far more comprehensive set of 
provisions governing interim measures. See Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration 
of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/17, annex I at 56-60 (as revised on July 7, 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL 
Model Law—2006 Amendment]. 
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Part II addresses potential sources of gap filling for incomplete 
contracts, beginning with an analysis of existing law under the FAA—a 
statute almost entirely devoid of default legal rules regarding the conduct 
of arbitration proceedings.27 In evaluating the effectiveness of the FAA as 
a set of default legal rules, Part II.A also looks at a variety of challenges 
under the existing multi-part statutory structure, while Part II.B addresses 
the broader question of whether gaps in agreements to arbitrate are more 
effectively filled by courts under a common law approach or by the 
legislature under a comprehensive statutory approach. 
Part II.C then examines the question of whether gaps—if statutorily 
filled—are best addressed by state or federal law. While most state laws 
historically provided little more than the FAA in the way of default rules, 
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA)28 expressly 
attempts to fill this void with respect to domestic arbitration.29 However, it 
is debatable whether RUAA goes far enough in providing a 
comprehensive statute, and its effectiveness is significantly limited by the 
potentially broad and, to some degree, uncertain preemptive effect of the 
FAA on various matters addressed by RUAA.30 A number of U.S. states 
have attempted to fill the void left by the FAA with respect to 
international commercial arbitration by adopting at least substantial 
portions of the UNCITRAL Model Law.31 However, these adoptions have 
not been particularly uniform,32 and significant unresolved issues of 
preemption call into question the effectiveness of such adoptions.33 
Part II.D addresses the availability of various institutional and ad hoc 
arbitration rules and the potential that such rules might obviate the need 
for any default legal rules. In comparing the relative value and 
effectiveness of default legal rules versus the parties’ own agreement, 
including privately chosen rules, Part II.D addresses the specific 
challenges of the unique contractual version of competence-competence 
(the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction) 
                                                 
27 Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 
15, at 236, 238. 
28 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000) [hereinafter RUAA]. 
29 Id. at Prefatory Note.    
30 See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 420 tbl.1. 
31 See Jack J. Coe Jr., The Serviceable Texts of International Commercial Arbitration: 
An Embarrassment of Riches, 10 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 143, 148 (2002). 
32 Gerold Herrmann, UNCITRAL’s Work Towards a Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, 4 PACE L. REV. 537, 538 (1984). 
33 See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 407-25.  
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developed by the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of the 
FAA. 
In conclusion, this Article calls for a new and comprehensive federal 
statutory scheme governing domestic and international commercial 
arbitration—and fully replacing the existing Federal Arbitration Act. Such 
a scheme could eliminate the need for state law or any “restatement” of 
the existing common law governing arbitration in this country and would 
fully complement the use of private rules of arbitration, to the extent the 
latter might be incorporated by the parties into their arbitration agreement. 
 
I. INCOMPLETE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE: 
THE NEED FOR DEFAULT RULES 
 
Parties may conclude a binding agreement to arbitrate their disputes by 
simply saying so in writing.34 They need not say anything more about the 
specific nature of their intent. As long as they agree to final and binding 
arbitration of a defined range of disputes and the dispute in question falls 
within the scope of this range, each of the parties is fully bound to 
comply.35 In agreeing to arbitration, the parties will have effectively 
displaced a detailed and fully developed set of procedures for adjudication 
of their dispute by a court. In the case of a simple, bare-bones agreement 
to arbitrate, however, the parties will have provided nothing to replace 
these court procedures. While a simplified dispute resolution procedure is 
admittedly one of the major reasons parties choose arbitration, few would 
likely say they chose arbitration for the lack of any procedure at all. Thus, 
we have a very real potential for binding arbitration agreements that lack a 
significant degree of completeness. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 In fact, an agreement need not even necessarily be in writing under the current 
version of the UNCITRAL Model Law. See UNCITRAL Model Law—2006 
Amendment, supra note 26, art. 7. See also Jack Graves, ICA and the Writing 
Requirement: Following Modern Trends Towards Liberalization or Are We Stuck in 
1958?, 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 36 (2009) (discussing the liberalization of form 
requirements for arbitration agreements). However, the extent to which national 
legislatures will follow this trend towards liberalizing form requirements governing 
arbitration agreements is yet to be determined. Id. at 39. 
35 Of course, the parties can always mutually agree to modify or terminate their 
agreement, as in the case of any contract. However, an agreement on the resolution of 
disputes is often particularly difficult to modify at the time of its performance because 
parties in need of binding dispute resolution will often have a difficult time agreeing on 
anything. 
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A. Reasons for Incomplete Arbitration Agreements 
 
All contracts are, to at least some degree, incomplete.36 The reasons 
for this lack of completeness vary, but might generally be divided into two 
broad categories: (1) lack of ex ante awareness of all of the factual or legal 
issues that might ultimately arise between the parties; and (2) lack of 
willingness or ability to expend the time, energy, goodwill, or financial 
capital to resolve the issue at the time of contract formation.37 The reasons 
for the latter source of incompleteness are particularly acute in the context 
of arbitration agreements. 
In some circumstances, “the very act of negotiating for a specific 
contract term may signal negative information to the other party.”38 While 
the basic suggestion of resolving any disputes through arbitration might 
generally be viewed in a positive light,39 attempts to provide further details 
with respect to such arbitration might very well suggest that the party 
suggesting these details believes an arbitrated dispute to be a likely 
outcome of the parties’ relationship.40 Or, even worse, any detailed 
negotiation of an arbitration agreement might be seen as an attempt to gain 
a tactical advantage in the event of such an outcome.41 Thus, an arbitration 
agreement is even more likely to be incomplete as a result of the perceived 
costs of completing the agreement more fully. 
                                                 
36 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 
78 VA. L. REV. 821, 821 (1992). 
37 Id. at 822; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989) (defining, 
more narrowly, the former category based on one party’s strategic behavior in 
consciously withholding information from its contracting partner). In the analysis that 
follows, this Article will treat this alternative source of incompleteness discussed by 
Ayres and Gertner as a subset of the broader category of cases in which the parties’ 
knowledge is incomplete, for whatever reason. 
38 Stephen J. Choi, The Problem with Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1233, 1236 (2003).  
39 At a very basic level, a general suggestion at the time of contracting that the parties 
agree to stay out of court would often be seen as quite positive in terms of the future 
relationship. 
40 Choi, supra note 38, at 1236. In addition, even sophisticated parties will often enter 
into a contractual relationship with an overly optimistic belief in their ability to avoid 
disputes, thereby reducing the potential value of “completing” the dispute resolution 
term. Id. 
41 In fact, at least one author suggests negotiating arbitration agreements in hopes of 
achieving just such a tactical advantage. Stipanowich, supra note 12, at 388-89. 
However, this same author agrees that, as a practical matter, this is often quite difficult, 
because parties intent on making a deal are reluctant to dwell on the subject of possible 
conflict resolution. Id. at 390. 
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Many parties, as well as many of their transactional counsel, will also 
often lack a thorough understanding of the myriad of issues that may—and 
all too often do—arise during the process of resolving a dispute through 
arbitration.42 When considering the options for binding dispute resolution, 
the parties essentially have two choices: (1) litigation; or (2) arbitration. 
While there are a host of positive, well documented reasons why parties 
affirmatively choose arbitration,43 many also choose it simply because of 
what it is not—in effect, choosing arbitration simply because it is not 
litigation.44 As a general alternative to litigation—albeit one that many 
parties do not fully understand—an agreement to arbitrate will often be 
incomplete based on the parties’ lack of knowledge regarding many of the 
nuanced details of arbitration. 
When we consider both the lack of knowledge with respect to many 
parties and their transactional counsel, as well as the significant potential 
costs of negotiating terms in specific contemplation of an eventual 
contract dispute, it is easy to see why many arbitration agreements are 
incomplete. This of course leads to the question of how, if at all, such 
agreements should be completed.  
 
B. Should the Law Fill Gaps in Any Manner When an Arbitration 
Agreement is Incomplete? 
 
The initial question is whether gaps in an incomplete arbitration 
agreement should be filled at all. The act of filling gaps in the parties’ 
agreement is ultimately a double-edged sword. On one hand, completing 
those items the parties left out due to ignorance or the high cost of 
completion would seemingly serve the parties’ interests in giving full 
effect to their intentions.45 On the other hand, completing the parties’ 
                                                 
42 Id. at 389. 
43 See Christopher Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) 
Arbitration Clauses? 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 435-37 (2010); Hon. Curtis E. von 
Kann, A Report Card on the Quality of Commercial Arbitration: Assessing and 
Improving Delivery of the Benefits Customers Seek, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 499, 
500-01 (2009); see also Loukas Mistelis & Crina Baltag, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards and Settlement in International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and 
Practices, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 319, 320, 322 (2008) (explaining a 2008 survey of 
corporate attitudes towards international commercial arbitration, but also useful with 
respect to commercial arbitration, more generally). 
44 Stephen L. Hayford, Building a More Perfect Beast: Rethinking the Commercial 
Arbitration Agreement, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 437, 439 (2009) (explaining parties’ 
very fundamental desire for “a clear alternative to traditional litigation”). 
45 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372 (3d ed. 1986) (suggesting 
that the law should supply the terms the parties would have adopted had they addressed 
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agreement also risks the possibility of getting it wrong. In fact, the parties 
may perceive that their agreement is fully complete—notwithstanding 
apparent gaps. 
For example, the parties to an arbitration agreement may have simply 
provided for binding arbitration before a single arbitrator chosen by the 
parties. While one might suggest that this agreement leaves a rather large 
gap with respect to the arbitral procedure, it might also be that the parties 
simply intended to grant the arbitrator complete discretion with respect to 
procedure.46 If so, then perhaps the agreement does not really include any 
gaps at all. 
The FAA does not speak directly to this possibility.47 However, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law provides a potential indication of the parties’ 
likely normative views. Article 19(2) provides that an “arbitral tribunal 
may, subject to the provisions of [the UNCITRAL Model Law], conduct 
the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate.”48 One might 
reasonably infer that this represents a commercial norm suggesting that the 
parties often prefer broad grants of discretion to the arbitrators. However, 
this apparently broad grant of authority comes in the context of a very well 
developed set of default rules governing many of the most common 
procedures likely to arise in arbitral proceedings.49 Thus, it is much more 
difficult to draw any inference that parties would typically grant complete 
discretion to arbitrators in the absence of any default rules. Moreover, any 
exercise of arbitrator discretion presupposes the existence of an arbitrator 
to exercise that discretion and, without at least some sort of default rule 
regarding the appointment of an arbitrator, effectuation of the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate is impossible.50 
                                                                                                                         
the issue); Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its 
Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985) (providing the parties with the 
term they would have negotiated had they recognized the issue and had the time and 
money to address it). But see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 90-91 (suggesting that 
the most efficient default terms will not always be those the parties would have wanted, 
but may sometimes be those that at least one party does not favor). 
46 See Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J. 169, 
180-81 (2007) (suggesting “unfettered arbitral discretion and control” as the “universally 
accepted ‘meta gap-filler’”). 
47 See id. Though, one might argue that the FAA speaks indirectly to the issue by 
largely omitting any gap fillers. Seemingly, this is Professor Rau’s view in suggesting the 
lack of need for specific FAA gap fillers. See id. 
48 UNCITRAL Model Law—2006 Amendment, supra note 26, art. 19(2). 
49 See, e.g., id. art. 17. 
50 One of the very few default rules provided by the FAA is that, if the parties cannot 
agree, a court shall appoint an arbitrator. 9 U.S.C § 5 (2006). Court appointment is not, 
however, the only option. Many institutional rules provide for appointment by the 
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Once an arbitrator has been chosen, the parties may grant that 
arbitrator broad authority to decide their dispute on equitable principles 
without reference to any particular substantive law.51 This sort of 
arbitrator authority might also suggest a broad discretionary norm. 
However, arbitral rules addressing the issue require the parties’ express 
consent to grant the arbitrator such broad discretionary power over the 
substance of their dispute.52 In the same vein, the parties are unlikely to 
have intended a grant of virtually unlimited procedural discretion in the 
absence of a clear indication of that intent. Thus, the parties’ intentions are 
most likely served by default terms reflecting those they would have likely 
agreed upon in the event they had addressed the issues in question. 
 
C. What Sort of Default Rules Might Be Appropriate for Filling Gaps in 
Incomplete Arbitration Agreements? 
 
The classic “majoritarian” approach to default rules is to seek to 
determine the rule that most similarly situated parties would have wanted 
had they actually considered and negotiated the issue at the time of 
contracting.53 In contrast, one of the most commonly discussed 
alternatives is the “penalty” default approach.54 The basic idea of a penalty 
default is that the default rule should be designed to be a rule disfavored 
by a party likely to possess information useful to its contracting partner.55 
The party with the relevant information is, therefore, faced with the option 
of either accepting a rule it does not like or disclosing the information.56 In 
the case of arbitration agreements, a “majoritarian” approach is likely to 
be the most appropriate. 
                                                                                                                         
institution. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND 
MEDIATION PROCEDURES 8 r.11 (2010); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, 
art. 6, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976) (providing for 
designation of any appointing authority by the Permanent Court of arbitration). 
51 See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N & INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INT’L 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 13 art.28(1) (2009). 
52 Id. at art.28(3). 
53 Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1441-42 (2009); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 93. 
54 Fairfield, supra note 53; see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 97. One of the 
classic examples of a penalty default is the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, which provides 
that consequential damages are limited by foreseeability. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 150 (1854). 
The party contracting for carriage is faced with either accepting a limit on liability for 
late delivery or disclosing to its contracting partner information as to the potentially large 
losses it might suffer with respect to late delivery. Id. With such information in hand, the 
carrier can negotiate over whether it is willing to accept such risks and at what price. Id. 
55 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 97. 
56 Id. 
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Penalty defaults are most appropriate when the ex ante cost of 
contracting is relatively cheap.57 However, the cost of contracting for 
specific details of an arbitration agreement is likely to be particularly 
high.58 Moreover, it seems unlikely that, at the time of contracting, either 
party would be strategically withholding information regarding a potential 
arbitration process that the other might value in negotiating a more 
detailed arbitration agreement.59 A majoritarian approach also seems 
particularly appropriate when one looks at commercial arbitration from a 
normative perspective. 
To a large degree, most business parties to a commercial arbitration 
agreement share the same general expectations. In choosing arbitration of 
a dispute arising out of a commercial, business-to-business transaction, the 
parties are typically interested in the following characteristics: 
 
• Arbitration is generally perceived as faster than litigation 
and, at least to the extent it is faster, cheaper than litigation;60 
• Arbitration is generally perceived as more flexible and less 
adversarial than litigation; 
• The parties may choose their decision-maker for his or her 
expertise, thereby leading to more accurate outcomes; 
• Arbitration is private and largely confidential;61 and 
• The decision of the arbitrator is final, thus bringing closure 
to the dispute and allowing the parties to return to any remaining 
business relationship.62 
                                                 
57 Id. at 93. 
58 See supra Part I.A. 
59 At the time of contract conclusion, it seems unlikely that either party would be 
sufficiently prescient to know what information it might strategically withhold from the 
other or, in contrast, disclose in attempting to negotiate around a disfavored default rule.  
60 The cost of the arbitrator makes this aspect of arbitration more expensive than 
litigation. However, the speed and efficiency of arbitration are generally thought to more 
than compensate for this cost, thus reducing the overall cost of the process. But see 
JACKSON WILLIAMS, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 61-67 (Frank 
Clemente et al. eds., 2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF11 
0A.PDF. 
61 The parties may agree upon a confidentiality requirement within the arbitration 
proceedings themselves. See, e.g., JAMS, COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES AND 
PROCEDURES 27 r.26(a) (2009). They may also agree upon a requirement that the parties, 
the arbitrators, and any institution maintain such confidentiality outside of the 
proceedings. See, e.g., LCIA, ARBITRATION RULES, art. 30.1 (1998). However, any such 
agreement is subject to required disclosures pursuant to judicial proceedings. JAMS, 
supra; LCIA, supra. Thus, the benefit of confidentiality is often lost when parties end up 
in court over issues arising out of the arbitration agreement. 
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When the transaction crosses national borders, the parties to an inter-
national commercial arbitration agreement share the same expectations 
listed above, but also typically choose arbitration for two additional 
reasons: 
 
• Arbitration provides a neutral forum, as compared to 
national courts; and 
• Arbitration awards are generally easier to enforce in a 
national jurisdiction other than that in which they are issued.63 
 
These latter two attributes related to international transactions in no 
way conflict with the former list of more general characteristics. Thus, 
there is no apparent reason why a set of default rules for domestic 
commercial arbitration would necessarily need to be any different from 
those suitable for international commercial arbitration. 
We can also find significant agreement on those attributes of 
arbitration agreements that parties find least attractive, most of which 
relate to the increased costs and delay associated with two things: (1) the 
increasing tendency of lawyers—especially American lawyers—to turn 
arbitration into something that looks very much like litigation;64 and (2) 
court proceedings in connection with an arbitration agreement.65 Each of 
these concerns can, to some degree, be minimized with an appropriate set 
of default rules.66 
A regime of default rules for arbitration based on a majoritarian 
approach would, therefore, likely include rules providing for a relatively 
expeditious, inexpensive, cooperative and flexible means of dispute 
                                                                                                                         
62 See, e.g., Drahozal & Ware, supra note 43, at 451-52; Kann, supra note 43, at 500-
01. 
63 See, e.g., Drahozal & Ware, supra note 43, at 452; MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra 
note 8, at 312-15. 
64 See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, International Arbitration Loses Its Grip: Are U.S. 
Lawyers to Blame? 96 A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (2010); see also Hayford, supra note 44, at 438-
39 (pointing out the stark difference between clients’ interest in efficient and cost 
effective dispute resolution and the lawyer’s interest in fighting to win every possible 
battle irrespective of the costs or effectiveness of doing so). 
65 See, e.g., Lou Whiteman, Arbitration’s Fall from Grace, CORPORATE COUNSEL 
(July 13, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1152695125655. 
66 The third concern about arbitration is that of the inability to join other parties to the 
dispute who are not parties to the arbitration agreement. While some national laws and 
institutional rules have begun to address this issue in a limited manner, arbitral 
jurisdiction is ultimately based on consent, and, without consent, joinder is likely to 
remain a challenge. As such, this issue is not addressed in the context of this default rules 
analysis. 
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resolution before a neutral expert decision maker; conducted in a private 
and confidential setting; and culminating in a final, and fully enforceable 
award, deciding the merits of the parties’ dispute, all with as little court 
intervention as possible. Admittedly, there are several important variations 
on this general theme, and frequent variations are found in institutional 
arbitration rules. However, these variations in rules are in no way 
inconsistent with the premise that a substantial majority of parties to an 
arbitration agreement are looking for the same general characteristics in 
resolving their dispute. For example, one might analogize a set of 
arbitration rules to the rules of carriage found in standard shipping terms, 
such as “Ex Works,” “Free on Board,” or “Cost, Insurance, and Freight.”67 
However, the fact that parties may choose terms of carriage that differ on 
important issues in no way undermines the value of the default rules found 
in uniform sales law, such as Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article 
2 or the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods.68 
In a similar fashion, a set of default rules governing commercial 
arbitration would provide a valuable baseline in filling gaps in the parties’ 
agreement in the absence of any express choice—either directly or by 
incorporation. 
It is often said that arbitration is based entirely on consent.69 When 
business parties fail to contract around a set of established default legal 
rules, the parties might reasonably be said to have tacitly consented to 
these rules by their silence.70 However, such an inference is only 
reasonable if (1) the parties had reason to know of the default rule and (2) 
the cost of contracting around the rule is not prohibitive.71 The latter issue, 
in particular, presents a problem in the context of an arbitration agreement 
because, as discussed earlier, the costs of negotiating an arbitration 
agreement may often be unusually high.72 Whether such costs are 
sufficiently high to preclude an inference of tacit consent, the issue is at 
least a problematic one in terms of inferring consent from silence. 
However, even where parties cannot be said to have tacitly consented via 
                                                 
67International Chamber of Commerce, Incoterms 2010, http://www.iccwbo.org/ 
incoterms/id3040/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Incoterms 2010].  
68 See infra Part II.D for a more developed comparison of default contract terms, 
adopted by way of incorporation, with default legal rules, adopted by choosing a 
particular seat for the arbitration. 
69 CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT, COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 
INVESTMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (2003).  
70 Barnett, supra note 36, at 826. 
71 Id. at 866. 
72 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
244 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW     [Vol. 2:227 
silence, the imposition of default legal rules “may still be justified on the 
grounds of consent when default rules are chosen to reflect the common 
sense or conventional understanding of most parties.”73 
In contracting for arbitration, “the parties’ subjective intent is most 
likely to be satisfied by a default rule that interprets manifested consent to 
reflect the commonsense or conventional expectations that are likely part 
of the tacit assumptions of particular parties.”74 Such commonsense 
expectations are those normative expectations shared by most people 
choosing arbitration for dispute resolution. Thus, where default rules are 
based on a strong, majoritarian set of commercial norms, they may be said 
to reflect the commonly held consent of the commercial arbitration 
community. To some degree, this argument might be made in support of 
any set of normative default rules, such as U.C.C. Article 2.75 However, 
the normative force of expectations within the arbitration community is 
arguably even greater than in most such identifiable transactional 
communities, as those common sense expectations tend to be particularly 
pervasive within that community. Thus, majoritarian default rules 
governing arbitration agreements may be reasonably characterized as 
reflecting the general consent of those businesses choosing to resolve their 
disputes through arbitration. 
The final issue regarding the nature of default rules is the extent to 
which such rules might be tailored to the particular circumstances of 
specific parties.76 Perhaps one of the most significant choices in dispute 
resolution generally and arbitration in particular is the choice between 
speed and cost on the one hand and reaching the “correct” decision on the 
other. This apparent tension need not necessarily present any conflict at 
all, as many disputes can be arbitrated quickly, inexpensively, and 
accurately—without sacrificing any of these virtues. However, to the 
extent these concerns may sometimes conflict, the parties’ expectations at 
the time of contracting may differ depending on the nature of the 
transaction subject to resolution of disputes through arbitration. If so, it 
may be worth considering whether default rules can be tailored to address 
this particular potential difference in expectations. 
                                                 
73 Barnett, supra note 36, at 827. 
74 Id. at 880. 
75 Such “common sense” rules might be contrasted with those that would not be part 
of the commonsense expectations of most commercial parties. For example, the default 
rules regarding the division of partnership profits seem quite contrary to common sense 
in many circumstances. Id. at 884. 
76 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91-92 (noting the distinction between tailored 
and untailored defaults). 
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The most significant critique of arbitration today comes from the cost 
and delay associated with long, protracted proceedings,77 and the business 
community is increasingly calling for a more expeditious, cost effective 
process.78 However, in at least some instances, business parties may value 
getting the “correct” result over efficiency. Thus, a set of default legal 
rules governing arbitration might distinguish between default rules 
applicable in expedited arbitration and those applicable in non-expedited 
arbitration.79 One option would be to leave this distinction to the 
arbitrators to make a determination on a case-by-case basis, depending on 
what is “reasonable in the circumstances.”80 While it is difficult to identify 
any singular method for distinguishing between the parties’ expectations 
in all circumstances, the size of the transaction will often provide a strong 
indication.81 
In any event, this potential conflict between efficiency and accuracy is 
one of the differences between party expectations most likely to lead to a 
need for tailored defaults,82 and any set of default legal rules governing 
arbitration should consider and address this and any other such issues. 
However, the need for a few select, tailored default rules in no way 
precludes a largely majoritarian approach to the provision of default legal 
rules governing incomplete agreements to arbitrate. 
                                                 
77 Seidenberg, supra note 64, at 51; see also Hayford, supra note 44, at 438-39 
(noting business decision makers concerns with delay and opportunity costs). 
78 See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 44, at 438-39; Peter Morton, Can a World Exist 
Where Expedited Arbitration Becomes the Default Procedure? 26 ARB. INT’L 103, 104 
(2010). 
79 For example—and only by way of example—the former might provide default 
rules requiring only a single arbitrator, minimal discovery, and short time frames for 
submission of pleadings, while the latter might provide for three arbitrators and greater 
opportunity for discovery. One might also suggest, in the latter case, an opportunity for 
some sort of substantive appellate review—an option arguably foreclosed under the FAA. 
See Hall St. Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding that the provisions 
for review of an arbitrator’s decision under sections 10 and 11 are exclusive). 
80 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91-92. This approach is used in a variety of 
provisions within U.C.C. Article 2. See, e.g., U.C.C § 2-206 (2005) (contract offer 
“inviting acceptance” when in manner “reasonable in the circumstances”). 
81 See, e.g., THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY OF BASEL, BERN, GENEVA, 
NEUCHÂTEL, TICINO, VAUD AND ZURICH, SWISS RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
21 art.42 (2006) (providing a default rule for expedited arbitration of disputes of less than 
one million Swiss Francs). 
82 The Swiss Rules actually contemplate both a discretionary tailored rule based on 
the “complexity of the subject matter and/or the amount in dispute.” Id. at 9 art.6(2) 
(providing for discretion as to the number of arbitrators), as well as a “bright line” 
tailored rule. Id. at 21 art.42(2) (providing for expedited procedures below a certain 
amount in dispute).    
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In thinking about a set of default legal rules governing arbitration, it is 
also worth considering the broader structural framework for such rules. 
For this purpose, Article 2 of the U.C.C.,83 as well as the Uniform 
Partnership Act (both original and revised),84 provide useful analogies. 
 
D. Arbitration Agreements as Nominate Contracts? 
 
The treatment of sales and partnership as unique and specific forms of 
contract goes back to Roman law, where each was treated as a form of 
nominate contract, complete with its own set of default provisions.85 The 
French Civil Code also treated arbitration as a nominate contract—a 
distinction still maintained today in the civil codes of Louisiana and 
Quebec.86 In the case of such nominate contracts, a code will necessarily 
provide for a default set of rights and obligations, which will govern the 
parties’ agreement in the absence of any contrary intent. While the 
theoretical underpinnings of traditional civilian nominate contracts and 
common law default rules are admittedly distinct, the basic ideas are 
sufficiently similar to be worthy of our consideration in drawing possible 
analogies. This civil law approach to codification of traditional nominate 
contracts is, to some degree, reflected in the U.S. approach to codification 
of the law governing the sale of goods and partnerships—two of the oldest 
forms of nominate contracts.87 As another traditional form of nominate 
contract, arbitration arguably deserves a comparable comprehensive and 
systematic approach to codification. 
In his campaign for enactment of a uniform commercial code 
governing, inter alia, sales of goods, Professor Karl Llewellyn often 
pointed to the cost of uncertainty in commercial transactions governed by 
common law as being a result of the uncertainty linked with the outcome 
being determined by the highest court of the relevant jurisdiction.88 
Llewellyn sought to avoid that uncertainty by providing a highly 
                                                 
83 U.C.C. §§ 2-305, -308, -309 (providing default terms for incomplete contracts). 
84 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP 
ACT 1 (1997) (stating in the Prefatory Note that the Act is “largely a series of default 
rules that govern the relations among partners in situations they have not addressed in a 
partnership agreement”), available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/Home_desktop 
default.aspx (follow “Final Acts & Legislation” link; then find the act in “Select an Act 
Title” box).  
85 BARRY NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 46 (1982). 
86 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-:4217 (2010); Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 
2005, c. 18 (Can.). 
87 See supra notes 83-84. 
88 Shael Herman, The Fate and the Future of Codification in America, 40 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 407, 428-29 (1996). 
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structured set of default legal rules governing the parties’ transactions in 
the absence of any contrary intent.89 He employed a normative approach to 
drafting these rules and weaved the individual provisions together in a 
comprehensive and systematic mosaic within which its own fabric often 
provides the basis for filling any remaining gaps.90 While perhaps not as 
storied as Llewellyn’s drafting of the U.C.C., the uniform laws governing 
partnership agreements in this country provide additional examples of 
comprehensive and systemic codifications of a specific form of contract 
that could otherwise be governed by the common law of contracts.91 
As explained more fully below, the same sort of uncertainty Llewellyn 
spoke of, over fifty years ago, exists today with arbitration agreements 
governed by the FAA—a bare bones statute largely displaced by federal 
“common law.”92 Instead of providing a comprehensive and systematic 
approach to the law governing arbitration, the FAA relies almost entirely 
on the common law of contracts, along with the developing federal 
common law governing those unanswered common law of contracts 
questions.93 There is no good reason why arbitration contracts do not 
deserve the same thoughtful statutory treatment the law provides to other 
unique contracts, such as those for the sale of goods or partnership.94 
The vast majority of other modern legal systems have done much more 
than the United States to develop default legal rules governing 
arbitration.95 The UNCITRAL Model Law (adopted, at least in part, by 
over fifty countries and seven U.S. states)96 contains a well-developed and 
reasonably comprehensive set of default provisions systematically 
addressing many of the issues that might arise under an arbitration 
agreement that does not incorporate a complete set of private institutional 
                                                 
89 Id. at 429-31. 
90 Id. at 428-29. 
91 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
92 Margaret Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How The Supreme Court Created a 
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 99-100 
(2006). 
93 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (stating that an arbitration agreement is valid “save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”). 
94 One might ask at this stage if arbitration ought to be governed by uniform state law 
instead of federal law. In fact, a number of states have adopted either the original 
Uniform Arbitration Act or the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. See infra notes 248 & 
257 and accompanying text. However, as more fully explained in Part II.C infra, the use 
of state law to cure the current ills of the FAA is fraught with its own set of perils. 
95 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26; NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE 
CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 1442-1507 (Fr.) [hereinafter Arbitration Rules of France]; 
Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 (Eng.) [hereinafter English Arbitration Act].  
96 Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26. 
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or ad hoc rules.97 A number of other countries, including France and 
England, have their own unique default legal regimes governing 
arbitration—somewhat different from the Model Law, but each far more 
comprehensive than the FAA.98  
Admittedly, not every incomplete contract should be completed by 
reference to default rules and not every type of contract requires a 
uniquely tailored statutory scheme.99 However, the unique and specialized 
nature of an arbitration agreement,100 coupled with a significant body of 
strong and well-established commercial norms surrounding such an 
agreement,101 would seem to demand a unique and comprehensive statute 
governing domestic and international commercial arbitration in this 
country.102 
 
II. FILLING THE GAPS: POTENTIAL SOURCES OF DEFAULT RULES 
 
The FAA governs both domestic and international arbitration.103 
Domestic arbitration is governed by Chapter 1,104 while international 
arbitration is governed by Chapters 2105 and 3.106 The original FAA 
(Chapter 1) provides for enforcement of domestic agreements to arbitrate 
and grants the parties broad autonomy in structuring such arbitration,107 
while providing very few default rules to guide the parties who fail to 
exercise that autonomy.108 Therefore, when one is faced with a “gap” in 
                                                 
97 See generally id. 
98 See Arbitration Rules of France, supra note 95; English Arbitration Act, supra note 
95. 
99 See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 59, 67 (1993). 
100 See Imre S. Szalai, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 319, 321 (2007). 
101 See IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOVICH, FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW § 7.1.2.1 (1999). 
102 This idea is more fully discussed infra, Parts II.B-D. 
103 See Szalai, supra note 100, at 325. 
104 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).  
105 Id. §§ 201-208. 
106 Id. §§ 301-307. 
107 Id. §§ 1-16. While a few new sections have been added to the FAA, such as those 
on appeal, 9 U.S.C. § 16, and the legal effect of the statute has arguably changed 
significantly through the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See generally 
Moses, supra note 92. The text of the original 1925 statute remains largely unchanged 
today. 
108 See Moses, supra note 92, at 111-112. 
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the details of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, the FAA provides little 
guidance in filling that gap.109  
Chapter 2 of the FAA addresses foreign and other “non-domestic” 
agreements to arbitrate110 and provides for the application of the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (the New York Convention) to such arbitration agreements and 
any resulting awards.111 Chapter 3 of the FAA also addresses foreign and 
other “non-domestic” agreements to arbitrate,112 but provides for the 
application of the Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (the Panama Convention)113 to arbitration 
agreements in which the majority of the parties are citizens of signatory 
states to the Panama Convention.114 While Chapters 2 and 3 serve their 
intended purposes of giving effect to these respective Conventions, their 
interaction with FAA Chapter 1 also raises some issues of uncertainty in 
their application.115 In addition the Panama Convention raises a unique 
issue because of its adoption of a complete set of default rules of the Inter-
American Arbitration Commission.116 
As more fully explained below, this broad, vague attempt at “statutory 
dépeçage”117 fails for at least two reasons. First, the overall statute is 
insufficiently detailed in providing default provisions.118 Second, many of 
the details it does provide in international transactions do not mesh well 
                                                 
109 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307. 
110 Id. §§ 201-208. 
111 Id. § 201; New York Convention, supra note 6, § 201. 
112 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307. 
113 Id. at § 301. See generally Panama Convention, supra note 7. 
114 9 U.S.C. § 305(1) (2006). 
115 See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1248. 
116 See 9 U.S.C. § 306(a) (2006); Panama Convention, supra note 7, 1 art.3. See 
generally SICE, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Arbitration Commission, 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS 
(July 1, 1988) [hereinafter IACAC Rules], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dis 
pute/comarb/iacac/rop_e.asp. This incorporation of a complete set of default rules is un-
ique in American arbitration law. 
117 “Dépeçage” is the process whereby a single legal relationship may be governed by 
different laws. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469-470 (8th ed. 2004). The term seems 
appropriate here, where the FAA attempts to apply a collection of separate and 
independent legal instruments to govern a single contractual relationship—the agreement 
to arbitrate an international commercial dispute. 
118 See Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra 
note 15, at 236. 
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with the law governing domestic transactions, and the overall structure of 
the statute arguably creates as many questions as it resolves.119 
 
A. The Current State of American Federal Law Governing Commercial 
Arbitration 
 
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925120 for the specific purpose of 
overcoming “centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements121” 
and enforcing contracts on an equal basis with other common law 
contracts.122 Since that time, the United States Supreme Court has given 
broad effect to this purpose in both federal and state courts123 and has 
consistently resisted state efforts to limit the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements on any grounds other than those applying broadly to any and 
all contracts.124 For those favoring arbitration generally as a means of 
binding dispute resolution, the FAA would seem to be a resounding 
success in achieving its original goal.125 However, the parties to an 
arbitration agreement are likely seeking more than just enforceability of 
their agreement—they are also likely trying to stay out of court 
altogether.126 In this respect, the FAA, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, and as amended by Congress to accommodate international treaties, 
has arguably been far less successful.127 
                                                 
119 See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1248. 
120 Szalai, supra note 100, at 325. 
121 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974). 
122 Id. at 510-11. 
123 See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding the FAA 
applies in state courts, as well as federal courts). This was arguably the single most 
important decision the Supreme Court has ever issued with respect to the FAA, because it 
preempted efforts by the states to regulate arbitration—at least to the extent such efforts 
were contrary to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of FAA article 2. Moreover, the 
preemption issues left open by Southland and subsequent Supreme Court cases are 
largely responsible for the uncertainty surrounding current state laws purporting to 
govern certain elements of arbitration. The original Southland decision drew a vigorous 
and well reasoned dissent. See id. at 21-36 (O’Connor, J. and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
At least one justice is still fighting the battle lost in Southland. See, e.g., Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting based on his 
view that the FAA does not apply in state court proceedings). 
124 See, e.g., Doctor’s Assoc., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-88 (1996). 
125 See Moses, supra note 92, at 99-100. 
126 See John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses Avoiding the 7 Deadly Sins, 
58 DISP. RESOL. J. 28, 31 (2003). Even if court intervention is unnecessary to give effect 
to the parties’ arbitration agreement, a party may find it necessary to resort to courts 
regarding remedies such as specific relief, which are generally unavailable from the 
arbitral tribunal. 
127 See, e.g., Moses, supra note 92, at 101. 
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1. The Federal Arbitration Act: The Minimalist Approach to Domestic 
Arbitration Under Chapter 1 
 
The loadstar rule of FAA Chapter 1 is found in section 2,128 which 
provides that an agreement “to settle by arbitration a controversy … shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”129 An arbitration 
agreement is fully binding as long as: (1) the parties agree in writing to 
final and binding arbitration and (2) the dispute in question falls within the 
scope of the arbitration agreement.130 Of course, many arbitration 
agreements will provide substantially more detail, either within the 
arbitration agreement itself, or by way of incorporation of a specific set of 
arbitration rules.131 Freedom of contract lies at the heart of commercial 
arbitration, with the parties granted broad autonomy in designing their 
own mechanism for the resolution of disputes.132 Moreover, parties are 
encouraged to exercise this broad autonomy by thoughtfully and carefully 
crafting an arbitration regime meeting their specific needs.133 However, 
the parties do not always exercise this autonomy in any great detail,134 and 
their agreement to arbitrate will be enforced whether or not they provide 
such detail.135 
For example, the parties to an agreement might provide that “[a]ny 
disputes arising out of this Agreement will be finally resolved by binding 
arbitration.”136 The parties would almost certainly be bound to resolve 
their relevant contract disputes by arbitration.137 However, with such a 
minimalist arbitration agreement, they would have to look outside the 
                                                 
128 David Horton, Essay, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 4 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/ 
2010/04/02/horton.pdf. 
129 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  
130 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 101, at § 7.1.2.1. 
131 Id.  
132 See Stipanowich, supra note 12, at 405. 
133 Id. at 403. 
134 See id. at 405. 
135 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
136 Townsend, supra note 126, at 31. Townsend suggests that this clause represents an 
extreme example of poor drafting. Id. However, this author has seen many such clauses 
in actual contracts drafted by both lawyers and laypeople. 
137 Id. 
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FAA to ascertain the details of such arbitration.138 In theory, the law 
governing the arbitration should supply the default provisions necessary to 
fill any gaps.139 Unfortunately for the arbitrating parties, the FAA provides 
very little guidance in this respect.140 
In comparison with most modern arbitration statutes, the FAA is a 
“bare-bones statute directed primarily at insuring that courts give effect to 
arbitration clauses and awards, and prescribes no significant procedural 
standards.”141 The FAA simply fails to answer many of the questions 
essential to the conduct of arbitration proceedings.142 As such, if the 
parties fail to answer these questions in their original agreement and 
cannot do so after the dispute has arisen, the questions all too often end up 
in court, thus arguably defeating the parties’ original purpose in agreeing 
to arbitrate in the first place.143 
Whatever one may think of the FAA, it would seem, beyond any 
rational argument to the contrary, that Chapter 1 does not itself fulfill any 
significant role in filling “gaps” by way of default rules.144 Thus, our next 
question is whether such gaps may reasonably be filled by the courts,145 by 
                                                 
138 Id. Of course, the parties could agree, after the dispute had arisen, to conduct the 
arbitration in a particular manner or according to a particular set of rules. However, it is 
common knowledge that, once a dispute has arisen, it is often difficult to get parties in an 
adversarial posture to agree on anything. For purposes of the foregoing analysis, I will 
assume that the parties are unable to reach consensus on any of the pertinent issues. 
139 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 101, at § 7.1.2.1; see also ALAN REDFERN & 
MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 
3-42 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. eds., 4th ed. 2004) (explaining that, in international 
commercial arbitration, gaps are filled by reference to the governing arbitration law—
typically that of the place of arbitration); Carbonneau, supra note 15, at 418 (pointing out 
that many of the procedural details of arbitration—about which the parties may 
disagree—can be resolved by reference to the law governing the arbitration, to the extent 
not addressed by the parties’ agreement). 
140 See Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra 
note 15, at 236. 
141 Id. (quoting Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in 
International Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 89, 90 n.3 (1995)). 
142 See id. at 238. 
143 One of the greatest criticisms of arbitration today is the fact that parties bargaining 
for arbitration end up in court attempting to enforce their agreement. See, e.g., Whiteman, 
supra note 65, at 1 (explaining that “[o]ur company ended up investing more than a 
year’s worth of time and substantial legal fees simply to enforce in court our right not to 
have to go to court”). It is worth considering at this juncture that a positive agreement to 
arbitrate is also, to a large degree, a negative agreement to stay out of court. As such, a 
need to resort to court in order to conduct the agreed upon arbitration proceedings would 
seem anathema to a basic agreement to arbitrate. This issue is explored more fully infra 
Part II.B. 
144 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). 
145 See infra Part II.B. 
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state law,146 or by arbitration rules.147 Each of these will be addressed in 
turn below. However, before leaving the FAA behind, a few final issues 
are worth noting. 
 
2. The Federal Arbitration Act: The Rest of Chapter 1 
 
While the primary focus of this Article is default legal rules, this 
Article will also address a few other key legal rules under FAA Chapter 1, 
some of which are mandatory.148 While this Article ultimately suggests 
that the FAA be fully replaced—not amended—certain of these additional 
provisions are important to understanding other attempts to “fill the gaps” 
in the parties’ agreement, as well as some of the other challenges 
presented by the existing legal structure. 
FAA sections 3 and 4 provide for motions in federal court to stay any 
pending court action or compel the parties to arbitrate a dispute subject to 
a valid arbitration agreement under section 2.149 One might reasonably 
read section 4 as providing a mandatory rule that the court must determine 
whether the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement and whether 
the dispute is within its scope.150 However, the Supreme Court has 
apparently held otherwise, ruling that this is merely a default rule, which 
the parties may displace if they would prefer to grant the arbitrators 
jurisdiction to make these threshold decisions as to their own jurisdiction 
over the merits of the dispute.151 This issue is more fully explored in Part 
II.E below.152 
Assuming that the parties’ agreement mandates arbitration of the 
dispute in question, the next potentially relevant provisions are those app-
licable to the proceedings themselves.153 Section 5 provides a default rule 
for appointment of arbitrators where one of the parties refuses to cooperate 
                                                 
146 See infra Part II.C. 
147 See infra Part II.D. 
148 Most provisions of Chapter 1, including section 2, rely entirely on party consent 
and are, therefore, subject to the parties’ right to override them—provided, of course, that 
the parties can agree. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. 
149 Id. §§ 3-4. 
150 See generally Horton, supra note 128 (claiming that section 4 is mandatory).  
151 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (explaining 
in dicta that “the question ‘who has the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon 
what the parties agreed about that matter” (emphasis in original)); Rent-A-Center, W., 
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, n.1 (2010) (applying the First Options dicta to a “clear 
and unmistakable” delegation of this decisional power to the arbitrator). 
152 See infra Part II.E. 
153 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 5-16. 
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in constituting the panel.154 The court is to make the appointment 
consistent with the parties’ agreement, or, in the absence of any 
agreement, choose a single arbitrator.155 The statute does not, however, 
provide any guidance as to how the court might go about exercising such a 
choice.156 
Section 7 provides for court assistance in enforcing a subpoena issued 
by an arbitration panel.157 However, Chapter 1 contains nothing more 
concerning the actual conduct of the arbitration from the time the tribunal 
is constituted through its issuance of a final award,158 which brings us to 
the last set of issues—those arising after an award has been issued. 
Section 9 provides for confirmation of an award: the process by which 
a private award is transformed into an enforceable public judgment.159 
This section provides a time limit for confirmations, a notice requirement, 
and jurisdiction, but otherwise mandates that an award shall be confirmed 
absent grounds for vacation under section 10, or modification or 
correction under section 11.160 Section 10 provides a narrow set of 
grounds for vacation, which might reasonably be summarized as 
mandating an arbitration process that comports with due process; is 
untainted by fraud, corruption, or bias; and is ultimately derived from the 
consent of the parties,161 while section 11 provides for modification or 
correction of certain clerical mistakes or issues in which the arbitrators 
went beyond the consent of the parties.162 Lastly, appeals of lower court 
decisions at any stage of the process are addressed by section 16, which 
generally makes decisions contrary to arbitration subject to immediate 
appeal,163 while decisions favorable to arbitration may not be appealed 
until the process is complete through confirmation or vacation.164 
Thus, we might reasonably summarize the key elements of FAA 
Chapter 1 by breaking down the governing law into three parts: (1) “front 
end” issues as to whether the dispute is subject to arbitration; (2) 
“arbitration procedure” issues involving actual arbitral process, from the 
constitution of the tribunal through the issuance of a final award; and (3) 
“back end” issues involving modification, confirmation, vacation, and/or 
                                                 
154 Id. § 5. 
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 Id. § 7. 
158 See generally id. §§ 1-16. 
159 Id. § 9. A motion for confirmation must be made within one year. 
160 Id.  
161 Id. § 10. 
162 Id. § 11. 
163 Id. § 16(a). 
164 Id. § 16(b). 
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enforcement of the award.165 Along with the basic enforceability 
provisions found in section 2,166 the only significant additional front end 
rule is the default rule reflected in sections 3 and 4 that courts determine 
whether the arbitrators have jurisdiction to hear the basic dispute.167 FAA 
Chapter 1 has only two significant default rules on arbitration procedure—
one regarding the appointment of an arbitrator and one providing 
arbitrators with the power to subpoena witnesses.168  
 Most of the back end issues involve mandatory rules, and FAA 
Chapter 1 provides an appropriately limited set of bases for vacation, 
modification, or correction.169 These bases for vacation in section 10 
present other challenges, which will be addressed later in this part, as well 
as Part II.E infra.170 
Notably, each of the above default rules involves direct resort to the 
courts, and the rule regarding appointment of arbitrators provides no 
guidance for a court in fulfilling its duties. Instead of providing default 
provisions defining the rights and obligations of the parties and thereby 
filling any gaps in their agreement, FAA Chapter 1 simply sends the 
parties to the courts to resolve the issue—assuming it addresses the issue 
at all.171 This approach is seemingly at odds with the most basic idea of 
arbitration—the resolution of the parties’ dispute without resort to the 
courts. 
The default rule that courts determine whether the parties have agreed 
to arbitration says nothing about which of these threshold jurisdictional 
issues should be determined by a court and which should be determined by 
the arbitrators.172 As a result, this has been an often litigated issue, in some 
                                                 
165 While one might reasonably break arbitration law down in a variety of ways, this 
Article will take what is, essentially, the same approach as the drafters of the Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act. See RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note pp. 2-3, 5 
(alluding to “front end” issues, “back end” issues, and “purely procedural dimensions of 
the arbitration process”).  
166 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
167 See Szalai, supra note 100, at 326. 
168 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. 
169 Id. §§ 10-11. For purposes of this Article, I will omit further reference to section 
16 on appeals, inasmuch as I do not believe its content is necessarily affected by the 
issues raised below. 
170 Id. § 10. 
171 Id. §§ 10-11. 
172 Id. §§ 3-4. This is not a single, unitary decision. By way of example, here are just a 
few of the questions that might arise: Did the parties agree to arbitrate anything? Is the 
instant dispute within the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate? Is the contract 
containing the arbitration clause itself voidable or void (the separability issue)? Is the 
dispute subject to arbitration at all, or is it one that must be heard by courts based on 
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cases reaching the Supreme Court.173 Again, this issue is explored more 
fully in Part II.E below.174 
The FAA also says nothing about its application in state courts. While 
the Supreme Court has, since 1984, unequivocally stated that section 2 
applies in state courts,175 the preemptive effects of the remainder of Chap-
ter 1 are far less certain. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 2, 
coupled with the express language of sections 3 and 4, would seem to 
produce the odd result that the FAA governs actions in state court, but 
such actions cannot be removed to federal court absent diversity 
jurisdiction.176 The open issues involving preemption beyond section 2 
call into serious question the relevance of state arbitration statutes that 
purport to govern many of the same issues addressed by the FAA, as well 
as many issues to which the FAA does not speak. This convoluted 
example of federalism gone haywire is explored further in Part II.C below. 
At this point, it is sufficient to say that FAA Chapter 1 leaves some “front 
end” issues in a state that is unnecessarily complicated and, in some cases, 
unresolved. 
There is little case law on FAA “arbitration procedure,” which is 
hardly surprising in view of the lack of FAA content addressing such 
issues. An exemplary case in this area involved the potential applicability 
of California state arbitration law, which provided for a stay of arbitration 
under certain circumstances, pending the outcome of related court 
proceedings.177 The outcome of this case presented anything but a clear 
picture with respect to the applicability of state law in any but the most 
clear-cut of circumstances.178 
While the FAA itself appears reasonably clear with respect to “back 
end” issues, the courts have, nonetheless, fashioned their own additional 
non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards—the most notorious 
being “manifest disregard of the law.”179 Again, the extent of FAA pre-
emption is uncertain and inconsistently applied by the courts. 
                                                                                                                         
public policy? Have the parties complied with any preconditions to arbitration, such as a 
mediation process that might be contractually required beforehand? Are each of the 
putative parties to the arbitration actually parties to the agreement to arbitrate? 
173 See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
174 Infra Part II.E. 
175 Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
176 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4. These statutes, by their express language apply only in federal 
court, and FAA Chapter 1 does not provide for federal question jurisdiction. 
177 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
178 See infra note 280. 
179 See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1249-51. 
But see Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008) (arguably 
eliminating the manifest disregard standard).  
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At bottom, FAA Chapter 1 does a very effective job of making 
arbitration agreements enforceable; however, what it gives with one hand, 
it takes away with the other. While arbitration agreements are generally 
enforced, the process of enforcing and executing those agreements all too 
often leads the parties right back to court to fight about issues that have 
nothing to do with their original contract dispute.180 It is no wonder that 
businesses are increasingly becoming frustrated with arbitration, as they 
end up “in a costly, protracted court battle over an issue that, by contract, 
never should have ended up in court at all.”181 
 
3. The Federal Arbitration Act, Chapters 2 and 3: A Schizophrenic 
Approach to Default Rules in International Arbitration? 
 
The plot thickens as we move from domestic arbitration under FAA 
Chapter 1 to international arbitration under Chapters 2 and 3. In theory, 
Chapters 2 and 3182 were simply intended to implement the New York 
Convention183 and the Panama Convention184 in the context of foreign 
arbitration agreements and awards under the FAA.185 FAA Chapter 1 
would still, however, apply to arbitration within the scope of either 
convention, unless in conflict with Chapter 2 or 3, or the relevant con-
vention.185 Inasmuch as both the New York and Panama Conventions deal 
primarily with enforcement of foreign arbitration agreements and awards, 
one might reasonably expect Chapters 2 and 3 to have little effect on 
arbitration conducted in the United States. We will see, however, that the 
provisions of these chapters have additional effects as well—at least some 
of which were not likely intended by the drafters. 
 
a. Arbitration Under the New York Convention 
 
Chapter 2 applies to arbitration agreements falling under the New 
York Convention—a convention that has been ratified by 145 countries.186 
                                                 
180 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
181 Whiteman, supra note 65. 
182 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 301 (2006). 
183 See generally New York Convention, supra note 6. 
184 See generally Panama Convention, supra note 7. 
185 FAA sections 201 and 301 are central to their respective chapters, inasmuch as 
they each provide for enforcement of the respective conventions. See MACNEIL ET AL., 
supra 101, at § 44.8.3.1 (1999). 
185 Id. 
186 Status: 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, UNCITRAL: U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [hereinafter Status: 1958 
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The application of the New York Convention is not, however, limited to 
awards made in foreign states. It also applies to awards that are not 
considered as domestic awards in the state where their recognition and 
enforcement are sought.187 FAA section 202 makes clear that any award 
that involves a foreign party or foreign property, or envisages foreign 
performance or enforcement is non-domestic—even if the arbitration takes 
place in the United States and is governed by United States law.188 Thus, 
Chapter 2 would apply, for example, to a transaction between United 
States parties that simply envisaged some foreign performance or potential 
enforcement against foreign assets. This broad definition of non-domestic 
awards solves one problem, but creates another. 
Section 203 provides federal question jurisdiction for all actions 
falling under the New York Convention, including all non-domestic 
awards, as defined in Section 202.189 As a result, the problem with the lack 
of federal question jurisdiction under Chapter 1190 disappears under 
Chapter 2. To the extent that either party wishes to avail itself of the 
federal courts in enforcing the provisions of Chapter 2, removal is 
available191—irrespective of diversity. Thus, the federal jurisdictional 
complexities associated with Chapter 1 are avoided. However, arbitration 
agreements subject to Chapter 2 remain subject as well to the provisions of 
Chapter 1, to the extent not in conflict with the provisions of Chapter 2 
and the New York Convention.192 
For example, section 206 provides for the appointment of arbitrators 
by a court, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, but says nothing about such 
appointment in the absence of agreement.193 Presumably, a court would 
simply look to section 5 of Chapter 1 for such authority194 as a residual 
supplement fully consistent with both Chapter 2 and the New York 
Convention; however, this overlap between Chapters 1 and 2 gives rise to 
potential inconsistencies in standards for setting aside or enforcing awards. 
                                                                                                                         
Convention] 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 
187 New York Convention, supra note 6, at art. I(1). 
188 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). 
189 Id. § 203. 
190 See supra text accompanying note 176.  
191 9 U.S.C. § 205. Venue is also provided for in 9 U.S.C. § 204.  
192 Id. § 208. 
193 Id. § 206; John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and Its Implementation 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 90 (2000) (noting that 
section 206 addresses appointment only pursuant to the parties’ agreement, thus 
necessitating resort to section 5 in the absence of any agreement). 
194 See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2009). 
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Chapter 1 provides standards for both confirmation of an award195 and 
setting aside of an award.196 However, these standards are somewhat 
different than those for enforcement contained in the New York 
Convention and those for set-aside contained in most modern arbitration 
laws.197 As a result, the standards for set-aside and enforcement may 
differ, depending on the application of section 10 (and perhaps section 11) 
to awards governed by the New York Convention.198 The proper answer to 
this issue is anything but clear. 
Under Chapter 1, section 9, an award is subject to “confirmation” (i.e., 
can be made enforceable) unless subject to being vacated, modified, or 
corrected under sections 10 or 11,199 thus seemingly applying the same 
standards to both set-aside (or vacation) and enforcement (or 
confirmation) under Chapter 1; however, Chapter 2, section 207, provides 
for “confirmation” unless an award would be subject to non-enforcement 
under the New York Convention200— again, a different set of standards 
than those contained in Chapter 1, section 10.201 If courts interpreting 
Chapter 2 were interested in harmonizing the standards for setting aside 
and enforcing awards, they might reasonably read section 207 broadly and 
apply these same bases for non-enforcement to actions to set aside an 
award governed by Chapter 2. Alas, they generally do not,202 so a legal 
action addressing the viability of an award may be governed by different 
standards, depending on whether it is styled as a “confirmation” action or 
                                                 
195 A private arbitration award is made enforceable through court confirmation 
proceedings. 
196 An award vacated or set aside by a court with proper jurisdiction is rendered a 
nullity for most purposes. 
197 In contrast, Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration provides for set aside provisions that essentially mirror the bases for non-
enforcement contained in Article V of the New York Convention. MORRISSEY & GRAVES 
supra note 8, at 462. This was done intentionally in an effort to harmonize the limited 
bases for non-enforcement, whether applied in the context of a set aside proceeding or an 
enforcement proceeding. See Pieter Sander, The History of the New York Convention, in 
IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS 11, 13 (Albert 
Jan Van Den Berg ed., 1999). 
198 For a more thorough examination of the inherent issues arising from the overlap 
between Chapters 1 and 2, see generally Jarred Pinkston, Toward a Uniform 
Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act: The Role of 9 U.S.C. § 208 in the Arbitral 
Statutory Scheme, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 639 (2008). 
199 9 U.S.C. § 9. 
200 Id. § 207. 
201 Bowman, supra note 193, at 98, 107. 
202 See, e.g., Jacada (Eur.), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 712 (6th 
Cir. 2005). 
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an action to “set aside” the award. The difference may be particularly 
dramatic to the extent a party may seek to have an award set aside based 
on the “manifest disregard” standard.203 
This inconsistency in set-aside and enforcement standards arising from 
the overlap between Chapters 1 and 2 is a perfect example of the problems 
with piecemeal amendment of the FAA and the reasons why a 
comprehensive new statute governing domestic and international 
commercial arbitration is necessary. In addition to the same 
inconsistencies presented by Chapter 2,204 Chapter 3 also presents its own 
unique challenge based on its overlap with Chapter 1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
203 This standard is unique to U.S. law, albeit considerably less certain in application 
after the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street. Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 552 
U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008). Circuit courts have split on the question of whether the 
“manifest disregard” basis for setting aside an arbitral award survived the Court’s 
decision in this case. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 
93-94 (2nd Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (holding that the 
doctrine has survived, but noting the contrary view of the First Circuit, and then finding 
that the standard was not satisfied in the instant case). In reversing the Second Circuit 
decision, the Supreme Court analyzed the arbitration panel’s decision under section 
10(a)(4) of the FAA, instead of the manifest disregard standard. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1767-68. However, the Court specifically declined to address the question of whether 
“manifest disregard” had survived Hall Street, while simultaneously noting that this 
standard was also satisfied in the instant case. Id. at 1768 n 3. In any event, the Second 
Circuit continues to consider the doctrine a viable one. See Matthew v. Papua New 
Guinea, No. 10-0074, 2010 WL 3784198, at *1-*2 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2010) (explaining 
when use of the “manifest disregard” standard would be appropriate but ultimately 
finding that “that the Arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law”). 
In providing its reasoning for continued use of the “manifest disregard” standard, the 
Second Circuit held in its original Stolt-Nielen decision that the doctrine was unaffected 
by the Court’s limitation of review to FAA section 10, because it believed the “manifest 
disregard” doctrine to be grounded in sections 10(a)(3) and 10(a)(4). Stolt-Nielsen, 548 
F.3d at 94-95. Section 10(a)(3) has no direct corollary under the New York Convention, 
and, while Article V1(c) of the Convention bears some similarities to FAA section 
10(a)(4), it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find any serious suggestion that 
Article V1(c) included the sort of “manifest disregard” standard applied under the FAA. 
204 Much of Chapter 2, including section 207, is incorporated into Chapter 3, and the 
Inter-American Convention provisions on non-enforcement are identical to those 
contained in the New York Convention. Thus, cases governed by Chapter 3 must address 
this same inconsistency between standards for set aside and enforcement. See, e.g., Banco 
de Seguros Del Estado v. Mut. Marine Offices, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684-85 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys. Info. 
Techs., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 9369, 2003 WL 23641529, at *5, *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003). 
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b. Arbitration Under the Panama Convention and Its 
Incorporation of a Fully Developed Set of Default Rules 
 
Chapter 3 provides for the application of the Panama Convention to 
the same categories of arbitration agreements governed by Chapter 2, but 
differs in that it only applies when a majority of the parties to the 
arbitration agreement are from signatories to the Panama Convention.205 
The Panama Convention has been ratified by a significant number of 
states within the Americas (including the United States),206 and will 
generally govern arbitration involving parties from two of these states or 
arbitration relating to a transaction that contemplates performance or 
enforcement outside of the United States.207 Thus, it has a potentially 
widespread application to arbitration agreements.208 
The Panama Convention is, to some degree, less complete than the 
New York Convention, thus potentially requiring greater supplementation 
via Chapter 1—with one major exception: Article 3 of the Panama 
Convention provides for the application of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC) in the 
absence of an express agreement by the parties.209 “The practical effect of 
this provision is to supply a great deal of arbitration ‘law’ through the 
                                                 
205 9 U.S.C. § 305.  
206 Argentina, Boliva, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domincan Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United 
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela have all ratified the treaty. Multilateral Treaties: Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration Signatories and 
Ratifications, ORG. OF AM. STATES, DEP’T OF INT’L LAW, http://www.oas.org/juridico/ 
english/sigs/b-35.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
207 In fact, based on the statutory language of 9 U.S.C. § 202 (incorporated into 
Chapter 3 by § 302), read in combination with § 305, an arbitration agreement in a 
contract between two U.S. businesses, which contemplated performance or potential 
enforcement abroad—even in a country not a signatory to the Panama Convention (e.g., 
in Germany, China, or Australia)—would be subject to Chapter 3 and the Panama 
Convention. Although an enforcement action governed by the Panama Convention makes 
little sense if enforcement is likely in a country not a signatory, there is no fundamental 
reason why an arbitration proceeding between two U.S. businesses contemplating 
performance in Germany could not be governed by Chapter 3 of the FAA. The author is 
not aware of any court or commentator who has addressed this issue, but it represents yet 
another anomaly arising from the piecemeal drafting of the FAA. 
208 For a more thorough examination than that provided herein, see generally 
Bowman, supra note 193 (distinguishing the Panama Convention from the New York 
Convention). 
209 Panama Convention, supra note 7, art. 3. 
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Commission rules unless the parties otherwise provide.”210 These rules are 
essentially identical to the original UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.211 
Currently, it may be worthwhile at this stage to recall the difference 
between a national law governing arbitration and a set of rules con-
tractually agreed upon by the parties by incorporating these rules into their 
agreement. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration is a modern law governing international commercial 
arbitration, while the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules represent a set of 
rules typically incorporated by parties seeking ad hoc arbitration,212 and 
sometimes used as a model for institutional arbitration rules.213 However, 
there is nothing precluding the use of a private set of rules, such as the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as the basis for a legislatively enacted set 
of default legal rules, as apparently enacted in the case of FAA Chapter 3. 
In fact, private rules and legal rules address many of the same issues214—
especially those default rules characterized in Part II.A.2, above, as 
“arbitration procedure” issues, but also sometimes including those 
characterized as “front end” issues.215 It is the latter group of default legal 
rules governing “front end” issues that present perhaps the most 
interesting conflict between Chapter 1 and Chapter 3. 
The bulk of these “front end” issues arises when the parties are unable 
to agree upon the appointment of an arbitrator. As explained above in Part 
II.A.2, FAA Chapter 1 sends the parties to court for appointment of the 
arbitrator.216 In contrast, the IACAC Rules provide for appointment of an 
arbitrator by the IACAC, thereby avoiding any need to resort to court 
                                                 
210 MACNEIL, ET. AL., supra note 101, § 44.8.2. 
211 Bowman, supra note 193, at 29. The only meaningful difference is the designation 
of IACAC as the appointing authority in the event that the parties are unable to agree on 
an arbitrator. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 50, at art. 6. Under the 
UNCITRAL Rules, an appointing authority is designated by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in The Hague. Id. 
212 This is arbitration under a specified set of rules, but without designating an 
institution for purposes of administering the arbitration. See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, 
supra note 8, at 35.  
213 See generally, Arbitration Rules of the Chicago International Dispute Resolution 
Association, CHICAGO INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION ASS’N (July 1, 2005), http://cidra.org/ 
arbrules (providing a list of these rules). 
214 The rules agreed upon by the parties, by way of incorporation, of course take 
precedence over any default legal rules, just as any specific provisions of the arbitration 
agreement, itself, take precedence over the incorporated rules. 
215 “Back end” issues are rarely addressed in private “rules,” as these more typically 
involve mandatory rather than default legal rules, such as the legal standards for set-aside 
and enforcement. Inasmuch as the parties have no power to vary such legal rules, there is 
little point in adding them to a set of private rules to be incorporated by the parties. 
216 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2006). 
2011]               ARBITRATION AS CONTRACT                263 
 
proceedings.217 Thus, the default legal rule applicable under Chapter 3—
by virtue of the application of the Panama Convention and its 
incorporation of the IACAC Rules—fundamentally differs from the 
default legal rule applicable under Chapter 1 on the question of 
appointment of an arbitrator in the absence of party agreement.218 This 
difference is fundamental because it reflects a basic difference between 
United States law and modern arbitration law with respect to court 
involvement in front end issues. United States law reserves “front end” 
issues for the courts,219 while many modern national laws and private rules 
grant considerable authority to the arbitrators or private institutions to 
address many of these “front end” issues. 
In particular, the vast majority of modern arbitration laws grant 
arbitrators the authority to determine their own jurisdiction under the 
doctrine of competence-competence.220 However, FAA Chapter 1 does 
not. As explained in Part II.A.2, section 4 provides that the basic 
jurisdictional question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate must be 
decided by the court.221 While the United States Supreme Court has now 
seemingly clarified that the parties may contractually grant the arbitral 
tribunal the power to decide its own jurisdiction,222 such a contractual 
right is not equivalent to a statutory grant of competence-competence.223 
Thus, the incorporation of the IACAC Rules via the recognition of the 
Panama Convention in Chapter 3 is quite significant, because Article 21 of 
these rules provides for competence-competence.224 
                                                 
217 See Bowman, supra note 193, at 32 (pointing out the positive practical effect of 
reducing the need for judicial intervention and the costly delay often associated with such 
proceedings). 
218 The author is unaware of any court attempting to address this issue under Chapter 
3. However, other decisions applying Chapter 3 give considerable cause for skepticism. 
See infra note 225. 
219 See RUAA, supra note 28, pp. 9-31, 35-49 §§ 2-8, 10-14 (including reference to 
involvement of courts in “front-end” issues in specified sections). 
220 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, art. 16. 
221 See supra Part II.A.2. 
222 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); see First Options of 
Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995). 
223 The problem is largely one of circularity. Under a contractual approach to 
competence-competence, any power to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate 
must come from the agreement to arbitrate itself. In contrast, a statutory grant of 
competence-competence is not dependent on the parties’ agreement, thus, to at least some 
degree, avoiding this problem of circularity. The significant problems with contractual 
competence-competence are more fully addressed infra Part II.D. 
224 IACAC Rules, supra note 116, art. 21(1) and (2). 
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By incorporating Article 21, FAA Chapter 3 has effectively provided 
for statutory competence-competence, a provision quite typical in modern 
arbitration law outside of the U.S., but quite unique in U.S. arbitration law. 
Unfortunately, this “uniqueness” has apparently led at least one court to 
fail miserably in its attempt to interpret and apply FAA Chapter 3 and its 
incorporation of the IACAC Rules.225 In fairness, the problem faced by 
courts attempting to interpret and apply Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA is 
one of attempting to reconcile substantially different bodies of arbitration 
law on a number of fundamental issues. Under such circumstances, 
perhaps it should not be surprising that courts are often not up to the 
challenge. 
Ultimately, the FAA provides solid footing for the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements to the extent the parties provide the details of such 
agreements. However, the FAA provides little more than bare skeletal 
provisions beyond its basic pro-enforcement bias. Moreover, the 
integration of the original act with the enabling legislation supporting the 
enforcement of the relevant international conventions has added further 
challenges and confusion to the growing common law body of United 
States arbitration law.226 
One suggested solution to the current confusion and inconsistencies 
found in United States law governing international commercial arbitration 
                                                 
225 See Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 25 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475-76 (Del. 1998) (giving 
effect to section 4 of Chapter 1 over the incorporation of Article 21 of the IACAC Rules 
under Chapter 3). The court first determined, somewhat inexplicably, that case law under 
FAA Chapter 1 was not “in conflict” with the Panama Convention. Id. at 475. Thus, the 
provisions of Chapter 1 were not superseded by Chapter 3. It is hard to see how one could 
support such an assertion, and the court does not. However, its analysis is also interesting 
for its remarkable preference for case law over a clear and unambiguous statutory 
provision. The court goes on to suggest that a statute should not be read to differ from a 
common law result, absent a clear and unequivocal imperative required from the nature 
of the enactment. Id. at 476. Finding no express intent to change the common law 
(notwithstanding the express intent in Chapter 3 to give effect to the Panama 
Convention), the court declines to give effect to the clear and unequivocal language of 
Chapter 3, the Panama Convention, and the IACAC Rules. Finally, the court seemingly 
characterizes FAA Chapter 1, section 4, as a mandatory rule of law (citing Article 1(2) of 
the IACAC Rules, which states that such rules are subject to mandatory rules of law), 
while simultaneously citing First Options, which clearly suggests that section 4 is not a 
mandatory rule of law, but one that even parties can contract around. Id. at 476; see also 
Bowman, supra note 193, at 140-49 (providing its own critical analysis of the court’s 
decision). 
226George A. Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial 
Arbitration, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 175, 176 (2009) (noting commercial arbitration 
is “an area of the law needing clarification”). 
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is a new “restatement” of this law.227 Normally, the idea of “restating” a 
statute would seem to be logically inconsistent with the basic nature of a 
statute.228 In this case, however, the very idea of “restating” the United 
States law governing international commercial arbitration demonstrates 
the inadequacy of the current statutory scheme—as a statute. In effect, this 
obsolete, inadequate, and often inconsistent statute has largely been 
displaced by federal common law.229 Thus, it might be useful to ask the 
more basic question of whether any arbitration—domestic or 
international—should be governed by common law. 
 
B. Gap Filling Under Federal Law by Courts or Legislators: Is It Time To 
Amend or Replace the FAA, or Should We Leave the Job to the Courts? 
 
Many of the gaps in the FAA have been filled by court decisions, 
including numerous decisions of the Supreme Court. In fact, these 
Supreme Court decisions have seemingly left the actual language and 
intent of the statute far behind.230 As a result, what we have today is 
arguably a body of federal common law governing arbitration. Assuming 
one agrees with this assertion, one might next reasonably ask whether this 
is a good thing. 
Professor Rau acknowledges that arbitration in the United States is 
governed today by federal common law,231 but suggests this common law 
                                                 
227 Id. (arguing the publishing of the new Restatement in this area will clarify aspects 
of U.S. arbitration law and judicial precedents). 
228 The author is by no means questioning the need to do “something” to improve the 
current state of the law in this area or the qualifications of the extraordinary group of 
individuals assigned to perform the task, but simply the concept of “restating” law 
purportedly governed by a statute. For example, it seems unlikely that anyone would ever 
suggest a “restatement” of the law governing the sale of goods, because sales of goods 
are governed in the United States by U.C.C. Article 2, unless displaced in certain cross-
border transactions by the CISG—each fully developed coherent statutes. 
229 It is this odd mix of statutory metamorphosis in conjunction with international 
conventions—now largely overtaken by federal common law—that gives rise to the need 
for such a restatement. Notably, restating the law governing international commercial 
arbitration is apparently proving to be an unexpectedly difficult task. See Bermann, supra 
note 226, at 175 (noting “already a number of difficult, and to some extent unexpectedly 
difficult, questions have arisen” in the development of a restatement). 
230 See Moses, supra note 92, at 99. 
231 See Rau, supra note 46, at 202. In effect, Professor Rau suggests that, by defin-
ition, a common law statute can never contain a “gap” inasmuch as such gaps are filled 
by decisional common law. Id. Thus, apparently, the “bare-bones” FAA is fully fleshed 
out if we simply know how to view it properly. Of course, it could also be said that any 
civil law statute, by definition, contains no gaps, inasmuch as any apparent gaps are 
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approach provides good reasons to leave the FAA alone rather than amend 
it.232 Rau acknowledges some of the standard rationales one hears in 
opposition to amending the FAA, including the notion that any attempt to 
tinker in any way with the FAA will open the proverbial “Pandora’s box” 
of various special interests and vexing issues.233 But Rau focuses primarily 
on his asserted belief that courts are more likely than legislators to “get it 
right” and provides numerous examples of what he believes to be 
particularly grievous examples of proposed statutory solutions to various 
issues arising in arbitration.234 
This focus on poor drafting and flawed reasoning might miss the mark. 
After all, it is likely that even Professor Rau would acknowledge the 
plethora of badly reasoned and poorly drafted court decisions on 
arbitration—though perhaps suggesting that a bad court decision is easier 
to fix than a bad statute. Presumably, one can find excellent examples of 
both judicial and statutory draftsmanship if one looks in the right places, 
and this is arguably the aspirational standard. If so, then this might lead 
one to ask if there is some basis other than institutional competence for 
determining whether arbitration ought to be governed by a comprehensive 
statute or a comprehensive body of common law cases. 
On this point, Professor Rau explains his basic preference for the 
common law, as an incremental and dynamic means of developing the 
law,235 and one could debate this question at length based on the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of common law versus statutory legal 
regimes.236 However, it is important to remember that this is a very 
specific sort of contract—an agreement to resolve disputes by 
arbitration—and not by court adjudication. As such, it would seem that the 
parties’ intent ought to inform the determination of an appropriate legal 
regime. 
At a bare minimum, the parties to a binding arbitration agreement have 
expressed their intent to resolve their dispute through final and binding 
arbitration. Assuming that the arbitration agreement says nothing more, it 
can, at the very least, be inferred that these same parties intended not to go 
                                                                                                                         
simply filled by looking to the general principles underlying the statutory enactment. 
However, that misses the issue, which is whether the actual express provisions of the 
FAA are sufficiently well developed to provide useful guidance as a set of default legal 
rules governing arbitration. 
232 Id. at 169. 
233 Id. at 170. 
234 Id. at 169-82. 
235 See id. at 199, 202-03 (showing support for the common law as a principled and 
accretional method for developing law). 
236 One might even go further with this analysis by comparing common law and civil 
law based legal systems. 
2011]               ARBITRATION AS CONTRACT                267 
 
to court.237 Thus, the very idea of using appellate court cases to construct a 
body of law to govern their relationship is antithetical to the notion of 
arbitration. Certainly, there will always be parties who overreach in 
attempting to take a dispute to arbitration when it belongs in the courts, 
and there will always be recalcitrant parties who attempt to avoid 
arbitration—notwithstanding an earlier agreement to use it for dispute 
settlement. Courts will also likely remain necessary for certain forms of 
specific relief.238 However, these occasions on which the parties must 
resort to the courts should be the exceptions, and they certainly should not 
be the lifeblood of the law governing an agreement not to go to court. 
Professor Rau correctly points out that arbitration is ultimately based 
on the consent of the parties.239 As such, the parties’ consent to arbitration 
must, at some point, be subject to judicial determination if disputed.240 
However, this determination need not be required as a threshold matter (or 
even necessarily permitted as a full judicial determination) prior to the 
constitution of the tribunal and completion of the full arbitral process—
including a jurisdictional determination by the arbitrators.241 Moreover, 
                                                 
237 A positive choice of final and binding arbitration is also a negative rejection of 
court adjudication. Cf. Julian Lew, Does National Court Involvement Undermine the 
International Arbitration Process?, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 489, 491 (2009) (saying that 
while parties to an international transaction may have additional reasons to avoid national 
courts, the parties’ implied rejection of court adjudication by choosing private arbitration 
is equally clear in a domestic transaction).  
238 Stephen P. Bedell & Louis K. Ebling, Equitable Relief in Arbitration: A Survey of 
American Caselaw, 20 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 39, 40, 79 (1988) (noting the impossibility for 
arbitration to grant rescission and reformation or to provide relief not explicitly 
contracted for in the arbitration agreement).  
239 Rau, supra note 46, at 204. 
240 Id. at 204-05. In fact, it is under the FAA that this obvious point has been called 
into serious question. In First Options, the Supreme Court seemingly provided that the 
parties could vest the arbitrators with the power to determine their own jurisdiction—just 
as they can vest the arbitrators with the power to decide the merits of their dispute. See 
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (suggesting that an 
arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction, if mandated by the parties’ agreement, should be 
treated essentially the same on review as a decision on the merits). However, such 
questions on the merits are not subject to appellate review, so one might reasonably ask 
whether, under this Court-developed doctrine of contractual competence-competence, a 
court would ever have the power to review the basic question of whether the parties 
agreed to arbitration. The Court’s recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), seems only to confirm and add to these concerns and is discussed 
more fully infra Part II.E. 
241 Under many arbitration regimes, the arbitrators not only have the authority to 
determine their own jurisdiction, but, in many instances, a court is precluded from con-
ducting any more than a prima facie inquiry prior to the arbitrators’ determination. See 
268 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW     [Vol. 2:227 
courts should be a last resort, because when the parties go to court, many 
of the specific benefits they sought in choosing arbitration in the first place 
are lost. 
The parties’ preference for confidentiality is typically lost with the first 
court proceeding, as their private dispute suddenly becomes public.242 The 
parties’ preference for an expert decision maker is lost to the extent their 
arbitration agreement may be subject not only to a court review, but to a 
jury determination.243 Perhaps most significantly, the parties’ desire for a 
prompt, efficient resolution of their dispute on the merits is completely 
lost in a painfully long process of court determinations—potentially 
including an appellate process to the highest level—before any decision 
maker ever has a chance to hear the merits of the underlying dispute.244 
Whatever one’s preference for the common law, it flies in the face of basic 
common sense to require parties to sacrifice the most fundamental benefits 
of their bargains in order to learn the content of those bargains. Yet, this is 
exactly what transpires when parties must go to court—and to appellate 
courts—in order to learn the default rules governing final and binding 
arbitration. 
In the case of an agreement to final and binding arbitration, the parties’ 
expectations are best served by a complete and comprehensive statutory 
scheme—not a piecemeal series of attempts to patch together an aging 
statute—but a complete and comprehensive statute, drafted to reflect 
normative commercial arbitration practices and the expectations of the 
business community. If, however, one agrees with this proposition, this 
does not end the inquiry, as legislation might be provided at either a state 
or federal level.245 The potential for providing default legal rules 
governing arbitration under state law is explored next. 
 
                                                                                                                         
John J. Barcelo, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and 
Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1115, 1124-30 (2003). Any subsequent review may be informed by the arbitrators’ 
analysis (even though it is not binding in any way on a reviewing court), and the issue 
may never arise, depending on the outcome of the arbitration proceedings on the merits 
(the party bringing a claim in arbitration would, of course, have no basis to contest the 
arbitrators’ jurisdiction over the claim). 
242 Arbitration proceedings are private, and parties are often bound to strict 
confidentiality requirements. In contrast, court proceedings are a matter of public record. 
243 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). Whatever one’s views as to juries, the parties’ intent to 
refer disputes to an expert decision maker would seem contrary. 
244 This is the most significant complaint expressed by business users of arbitration 
today. See supra Part I. 
245 For example, U.C.C. Article 2, discussed supra at Part I.C, is a model statute 
enacted at the state level. 
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C. What About State Law? 
 
Arbitration may also—at least potentially—be governed by state law, 
and virtually every state has enacted a statute of some sort governing 
arbitration.246 The following states have general arbitration statutes that 
follow the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956 (UAA): Arkansas; Delaware; 
Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Maine; Maryland; 
Massachusetts; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; South Carolina; South 
Dakota; Tennessee; Virginia; and Wyoming.247 This Act addresses most of 
the same issues addressed by the FAA, but also adds provisions addressing 
a few procedural issues ignored by the FAA, as well as an additional 
specific ground for vacating an award where there was no agreement to 
arbitrate.248 
The following states have not explicitly adopted the UAA, but their 
arbitration statutes include provisions very similar to the UAA: 
Connecticut; Florida; New Hampshire; Ohio; Pennsylvania; Texas; and 
                                                 
246 In fact, the Uniform Arbitration Act dates back to 1955, and, by the year 2000, 
forty-nine states had arbitration acts. RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note (2000). 
247 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-201 to 16-7-224 (2007); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 
5701-5725 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 7-901 to 7-922 (2007); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/1-5/23 (2007); IND. CODE §§ 34-57-2-1 to 34-57-2-22 (2007); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 
679A.1-679A.19 (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 5-401 to 5-422 (2007); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 417.045-417.240 (LexisNexis 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 
5927-5949 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (LexisNexis 
2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (LexisNexis 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
435.350-435.470 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to 27-5-324 (2007); NEB. 
Rev. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-2601 to 25-2622 (LexisNexis 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-
10 to 15-48-240 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-25A-1 to 21-25A-38 (2007); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to 29-5-320 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-577 to 8.01-581.16 
(2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-36-101 to 1-36-119 (2007). 
248 See generally UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25 (1956). More specifically, 
section 12(a)(5) provides for vacation of an award where the arbitrators themselves (and 
not the court) determined the parties had agreed to arbitrate and did so over an objection 
by the party seeking vacation, and the reviewing court determines that the parties did not 
agree to arbitrate the dispute. Id. at § 12(a)(5). This provision would seem to avoid the 
challenges presented by the Supreme Court’s dicta in First Options, suggesting a more 
deferential standard of review under such circumstances. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. 
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (suggesting that an arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction, 
if mandated by the parties’ agreement, should be treated essentially the same on review 
as a decision on the merits). However, one might ask if this “solution” to the First 
Options problem somehow makes the statute less “pro-arbitration,” in which case it 
would likely be preempted by the FAA. 
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Vermont.249 The Mississippi Code looks particularly similar to the UAA; 
however, it does seem to add more provisions than the UAA.250 For 
example, it adds a Notice to Parties provision and the Code goes more into 
detail on the role of arbitrators.251 Michigan has adopted many of the same 
provisions as the UAA, but has taken a rather unique approach in getting 
there. The actual statute includes a general provision on enforceability, a 
provision for court appointment of an arbitrator, and provisions on court 
jurisdiction and venue, but little else of obvious consequence.252 However, 
section 5021 directs the reader to the rules of the Michigan Supreme 
Court,253 which include a number of provisions on procedure, as well as 
confirmation, vacation, or modification—much like those of the UAA.254 
Of course, by including such provisions in the court rules, the legislature 
has delegated the power to amend these rules to the Michigan Supreme 
Court.255 
The following states have general arbitration statutes that follow the 
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA): Alaska; Arizona; Colorado; 
Hawaii; Minnesota; Nevada; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Carolina; 
North Dakota; Oklahoma; Oregon; Utah; and Washington.256 Even though 
                                                 
249 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-408 to 52-424 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 682.01-682.22 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-542:11 (2007); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-2711.16 (LexisNexis 2007); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
7301-7320 (West 2007); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. §§ 171.001-171.098 
(West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5641-5681 (2007). 
250 MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-1 to 11-15-37 (2007). 
251 Id. §§ 11-15-5, 11-15-7. 
252 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5001-600.5035 (West 2007). 
253 See id. § 600.5021 (stating that “[t]he arbitration shall be conducted in accordance 
with the rules of the supreme court”). 
254 See MICH. CT. R. 3.602. Rule 3.602 further cross-references the reader to the 
standard rule of civil procedure for subpoenas. See id. at (F)(1). 
255 See MICH. CT. R. 1.201. One could reasonably ask if this might be a more 
transparent and predictable approach than that of the United States Supreme Court in 
periodically defining or redefining the contours of the FAA. 
256 RUAA, supra note 28; ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.300-09.43.595 (2007); COLO. 
REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to 13-22-223 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658A-1 to 658A-29 
(West 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38.206-38.248 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 2A:23B-1 to 2A:23B-32 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-1 to 44-7A-32 
(West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-569.1 to 1-569.31 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-
29.3-01 to 32.29.3-29 (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1851-1881 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 36.600-36.740 (West 2007); UTAH CODE. ANN. §§ 78B-11-101 to 78B-11-131 
(LexisNexis 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.101-7.04.220 (West 2007). Arizona 
and Minnesota enacted these statutes in 2010. See H.R. 2430, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(Ariz. 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/hb2430h.pdf; H.R. 
1692, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/ 
2011]               ARBITRATION AS CONTRACT                271 
 
the following states have not explicitly adopted the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act, their statutory provisions are extremely similar to those of 
the RUAA: California; Georgia; and Rhode Island.257 Wisconsin has 
adopted an extremely detailed arbitration statute and, more specifically, an 
explicit set of default provisions.258 
The Louisiana statute largely mirrors the FAA, while adding a few 
provisions similar to those found in the UAA.259 Perhaps of more interest 
in relation to the issues explored by this Article in Part I.D, the Louisiana 
statute is extraordinarily unique in its placement. While found within 
Revised Statutes, it has been placed in a section specifically addressing 
“Code Ancillaries,” and within that section, among various forms of 
nominate contracts. In effect, Louisiana law treats arbitration as a civil 
code based nominate contract.260 
The remaining states have arbitration statutes that are arguably even 
more minimalist in nature than the FAA. The Alabama Code focuses 
primarily on the arbitrators and a few procedural matters but does not even 
clearly state that ex ante arbitration clauses are enforceable.261 West 
Virginia’s statute addresses even fewer issues than Alabama’s and clearly 
applies only to ex post submissions of controversies.262 The New York 
statute addresses basic questions of enforceability, motions to compel or 
stay proceedings, a few procedural matters, and grounds for vacation of an 
award.263 However, the statute is remarkably minimalist for a state where 
the most well-known American arbitration institution makes its home,264 
and many complex commercial cases are undoubtedly arbitrated. 
Notwithstanding the current menagerie of state laws described above, 
one might reasonably suggest that—whatever the deficiencies in the 
                                                                                                                         
data/revisor/law/ 2010/ 0/2010-264.pdf. The District of Columbia has also adopted 
RUAA. See D.C. CODE §§ 16-4401 to 16-4432 (2001). 
257 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to 
9-9-18 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to 10-3-21 (2007). 
258 WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 788.01-788.18 (West 2007). 
259 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-9:4217 (2007). 
260 As noted supra at note 86, the Québec Civil Code treats arbitration in a similar 
manner. 
261 ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-1 to 6-6-16 (2007). 
262 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-1 to 55-10-8 (West 2007). Arguably, one might 
reason-ably suggest that this is not an arbitration statute at all, inasmuch as it does not 
even hint at addressing ex ante arbitration agreements. 
263 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501-7514 (MCKINNEY 2007). 
264 AAA Offices: Headquarters and Departments, AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC’N, http:// 
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29067 (“1633 Broadway, 10th Floor, New York, New York 
10019”) (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
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FAA—the gaps in federal law could be filled by uniform state law instead 
of federal law. In fact, this was one of the primary objectives behind the 
relatively recent revision and promulgation of the RUAA.265 
 
1. The RUAA as an Attempt To Fill Gaps in the Federal Arbitration 
Act and Provide Default Legal Rules Under State Law 
 
The prefatory note to the RUAA points out that, while effective in 
ensuring the enforceability of arbitration agreements, earlier state law had 
failed to address many issues arising in modern arbitration 
agreements266—much as the FAA has ensured enforceability of arbitration 
agreements but failed to address many of the issues arising in modern 
arbitration agreements. The RUAA was expressly intended to provide a 
“default mechanism if the parties do not have a specific agreement on a 
particular issue.”267 While the drafters realized that “front end” and “back 
end” issues might well be preempted by the FAA, the RUAA was 
intended primarily to address default legal rules governing “arbitration 
procedure,” which are virtually non-existent within the FAA.268 
Ten years after its completion, the RUAA has only been adopted by 
fourteen states and the District of Columbia.269 It is, thus, questionable 
whether it is realistic to assume that the RUAA could serve to provide any 
“uniform” default legal rules governing even “arbitration procedure” any 
time in the near future. The reasons for this somewhat lackluster 
performance may be manifold, but the following two possibilities come to 
mind. 
First, the actual provisions of the RUAA have been the subject of 
significant criticism. Professor Rau frequently points to the drafting of the 
RUAA in his efforts to suggest that legislators (even private legislators) 
are less competent than courts to provide legal rules governing arbitration, 
and in doing so points out particular specific problems with the statute.270 
The RUAA also attempts to address the broad array of existing arbitration 
agreements, including consumer and employee arbitration but fails to 
                                                 
265 RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 Id.; see supra Part II.A.2 for a definitional explanation of “front end” issues, “back 
end” issues, and “arbitration procedure.” 
269 A Few Facts About the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ActSearch 
Results.aspx (last visited on Mar. 27, 2011). 
270 See Rau, supra note 46, at 170-79. 
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remedy many of the failures of the FAA in this respect.271 More 
importantly for the focus of this Article on business-to-business 
arbitration, one of the advisors to the drafting committee levels a more 
general criticism, suggesting that the default procedural rules within the 
RUAA are more consistent with lawyers’ views of traditional litigation 
than with business attitudes regarding the virtues of arbitration.272 To be 
sure, the RUAA also has its proponents and believers.273 However, it has 
failed to achieve the sort of broad acceptance normally associated with a 
“uniform” state law. 
Second, the extent of FAA preemption is anything but certain. While 
the drafters of the RUAA assumed that the FAA did not preempt state 
procedural rules, as long as such rules were pro-arbitration, the extent of 
FAA preemption remains to a large degree unresolved. The FAA 
unquestionably has broad preemptive force in displacing state laws 
governing arbitration.274 While some continue to urge a significant role for 
state law, such as the RUAA,275 and a more limited view of preemption, 
the issue remains subject to significant questions.276 In the face of such 
uncertainty, the only effective way to provide for default legal rules is 
through new federal law.277 
 
2. Additional Challenges in Looking to State Law for Default Legal 
Rules 
 
In addition to the challenges addressed above, there may be an even 
more fundamental reason why state law cannot reasonably serve as the 
                                                 
271 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Is It the Wrong 
Cure?, 4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 10, 12 (2002). 
272 See Hayford, supra note 44, at 437-39. Professor Hayford is specifically singled 
out as one of the major contributors, as a member of the RUAA drafting committee. 
RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note. 
273 Roger Alford, Report to Law Revision Commission Regarding Recommendations 
for Changes to California Arbitration Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2003). 
274 See Rau, supra note 46, at 192.  
275 See generally Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A 
State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175 (2002); Jill I. Gross, Over-
Preemption of State Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2004) 
(suggesting a role for state law, even on “back end” issues). 
276 See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 411-15 (raising doubts about the 
application of state law default rules in the face of broad FAA preemption). 
277 See Timothy J. Heinsz, The 2000 Revision to the Uniform Act: A Harbinger?, 3 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 435, 435-36 (2003) (suggesting that, because of the preemptive 
effect of the FAA, new federal law is the only way to address fully its many 
inadequacies). 
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foundation for a system of default legal rules governing arbitration. It is 
worth recalling that default rules are most needed when the parties have 
drafted a relatively minimalist agreement. Such a minimalist agreement 
may arise from the parties’ ignorance regarding many of the more nuanced 
issues that may arise in arbitration and may often be a product of the 
parties’ desire to avoid focusing on dispute resolution when negotiating a 
business transaction.278 Under such circumstances, it seems unlikely that a 
party would include a clause expressly choosing the arbitration law of a 
particular state. 
A general choice-of-law provision will not typically determine the law 
governing the parties’ arbitration agreement.279 Thus, the parties must, in 
some manner, provide a specific choice of law with respect to their 
arbitration agreement if such agreement is to be governed by state law 
rather than the FAA.280 However, it seems unlikely that a typical business 
party would be aware of such a need. Moreover, an express choice of law 
governing an arbitration agreement would seemingly suggest to one’s 
contracting partner that disputes arising out of the contemplated 
transaction may be likely. Finally, the very notion of choosing law to 
govern arbitration, a largely private dispute resolution procedure, may be 
counter-intuitive to the typical business person—no matter how important 
                                                 
278 See supra Part I.A. 
279 The arbitration agreement is separable (or severable) from and fully independent 
of the parties’ broader transaction. As such, a general choice-of-law provision is typically 
deemed to govern only that broader transaction and not the arbitration agreement. 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Bermann, supra note 
5, at 1018. But see Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) 
(inexplicably applying California law based on a general choice of law provision in the 
parties’ contract, and never expressly overruled by subsequent precedent more in line 
with the general rule). Notwithstanding the anomalous result in Volt, few, if any, would 
suggest that a court should apply state law to an arbitration agreement based solely on a 
general choice-of-law provision in the parties’ contract. 
280 In the absence of any express choice, an arbitration agreement is almost 
universally governed by the law of the place of arbitration—the lex arbitri. Bermann, 
supra note 5, at 1018-19. Thus, one might reasonably ask if the choice of a particular 
state as the place of arbitration also amounts to a choice of that state’s arbitration law. See 
Jack Garvey & Totten Heffelfinger, Towards Federalizing U.S. International 
Commercial Arbitration Law, 25 INT’L LAW 209, 216 (1991) (raising the same uncertain 
question almost twenty years ago). However, as a matter of practice, courts give virtually 
no analysis to the issue and simply apply the FAA. Id. at 1018-22. Presumably, the broad 
preemptive effect of the FAA gives rise to a presumption that the FAA governs, as the lex 
arbitri, rather than any otherwise applicable state law. See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, 
supra note 5, at 411-15 (expressing doubt regarding the implied intent reflected in the 
choice of a place of arbitration as sufficient to amount to a choice of state default rules). 
At the very least, the current state of jurisprudence on choice of law governing arbitration 
gives rise to considerable uncertainty. 
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that choice may later prove to be. As such, it seems that state arbitration 
law—even if otherwise perfectly suitable—would rarely, if ever, apply to 
govern the parties’ arbitration agreement when they most need default 
legal rules. 
Moreover, the decision of the United States Supreme Court, in Volt,281 
highlights the uncertainty in choosing state law. Whether a question of the 
effect of a choice-of-law provision or the effect of FAA preemption,282 the 
parties’ attempt to invoke state law will often lead them back to federal 
court for an answer to these questions. Thus, their intent to arbitrate their 
disputes and stay away from the courthouse is once again undermined. 
 
3. State Laws Governing International Arbitration 
 
Thirteen states have adopted specific laws governing international 
commercial arbitration, and eight of these states have, to varying degrees, 
based these statutes on the UNCITRAL Model Law.283 These state law 
formulations governing international commercial arbitration also suffer 
many of the same challenges discussed above, including federal 
preemption and the necessity of some sort of specific choice of state 
arbitration law by the parties—as well as all of the uncertainties present 
therein. However, the adoptions of the Model Law raise some additional 
issues worth mentioning briefly. 
Unlike the RUAA, the UNCITRAL Model Law is a complete modern 
law governing all aspects of arbitration, from commencement through 
final award, including actions for set aside or enforcement.284 As such, its 
complete adoption285 raises far more potential conflicts with the FAA than 
                                                 
281 489 U.S. 468 (1989); see also discussion of case cited supra note 279. 
282 See supra Part II.C.1. 
283 RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note (indicating that twelve states have enacted 
specialized provisions regarding international commercial arbitration, of which seven 
have based these enactments largely upon the UNCITRAL Model Law; however, 
Florida’s 2010 enactment in the following list adds one more state to this list). The 
UNCITRAL Model Law serves, to a large degree, as the basis for the statutes adopted by 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas. 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1287.12-1297.337 (Deering 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 50a-
100 to 50a-139 (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.0001-684.0048 (LexisNexis 2010); 710 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/1-5 to 30/25-30 (LexisNexis2010); LA. REV.STAT. §§ 9:4241-
9:4276 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.31 to 1-567.67 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 
36.450-36.558 (2010); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 172.001-172.175 (West 
2010). 
284 RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note. 
285 Not all of the eight states utilizing the Model Law as the basis for their own 
legislation adopted all of its provisions. However, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana and 
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the RUAA. In addition to the provisions on “arbitration procedure,”286 the 
Model Law provisions on “back end” and “front end” issues differ 
significantly from the FAA. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law, like the New York Convention, includes 
different bases for set aside or non-enforcement than those contained in 
FAA section 10.287 Inasmuch as section 10 has been deemed to be a 
mandatory legal rule rather than default provisions,288 the likelihood of 
preemption seems far greater.289 At the front end of the arbitral process, 
the Model Law provides for statutory competence-competence, in direct 
contrast to FAA section 4.290 Under section 4, a court must first decide any 
issue as to whether the parties agreed to arbitration, whereas Model Law 
Article 16 grants the arbitrators the power to make this determination.291 It 
is now clear that section 4 is far less of a mandatory rule of law than 
section 10, as section 4 may yield to a “clear and unmistakable” contrary 
choice by the parties to delegate jurisdictional decisions to the 
                                                                                                                         
Oregon substantially adopted the Model Law in its entirety. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
50a-100 to 50a-139; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.0001-684.0048; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
9:4241-9:4276; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36.450-36.558, and all eight of these states have 
adopted the Model Law provisions on competence-competence (the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1287.161; CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 50a-116; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.0001-684.0017; 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 30/15-5; LA. REV. STAT.   9:4256; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.46; OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 36.484; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.001-172.082. 
286 While different than those contained in RUAA, the Model Law procedural 
provisions raise the same sort of preemption issues as RUAA. 
287 While different from section 10 of the FAA, the Model Law and New York Con-
vention contain essentially identical provisions for both. Model Law Article 36 is 
identical to New York Convention Article V on enforcement issues, and Model Law 
Article 34 differs only in terms of the applicable law on the final two bases for set aside. 
The latter two bases address subject matter arbitrability (not to be confused with the 
broad misuse of the term by the U.S. Supreme Court) and public policy, each applying 
the law of the place of enforcement in actions to enforce and the place of arbitration in 
actions to set aside an award. 
288 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (precluding the parties from 
agreeing to expanded judicial review by holding that such review was statutorily limited 
to those grounds listed in section 10). 
289 In fact, one might reasonably infer that the California, Illinois, and Texas 
legislatures consciously omitted Articles 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
addressing set aside and enforcement based on their likely preemption by the FAA. North 
Carolina’s approach is more curious, inasmuch as it appears to add its own grounds for 
set aside, different from either the FAA or Model Law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.46. 
290 See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, at art. 16. 
291 Id. 
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arbitrators.292 However, section 4 of the FAA is much less likely to defer 
to state law, as the issue is unequivocally one governed by “‘substantive 
federal arbitration law.’”293 
Lastly, it is worth recalling the discussion in Part II.A.3.b regarding 
Chapter 3 of the FAA and its incorporation of the IACAC Rules, which 
are themselves based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. While the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are, in many ways, quite similar to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, they are not in fact the same. Thus, an 
arbitration agreement governed by Chapter 3 under the FAA, but perhaps 
subject to a state adoption of the Model Law based on the parties’ express 
choice, would likely present some particularly challenging preemption 
questions, along with the previously discussed issues relating to conflicts 
between FAA Chapter 1 and Chapter 3.294 
Thus, any state law attempting to remedy the deficiencies in the FAA 
regarding international commercial arbitration is even more likely to raise 
preemption issues and questions giving rise to uncertainty in the arbitral 
process, thus presenting an even greater likelihood of judicial 
involvement. The role of the FAA in United States arbitration is far too 
central to simply work around it. For effective legal reform, the menagerie 
of the FAA and its considerable body of federal common law must be 
replaced by a single, new, comprehensive statute. However, one final 
question remains. Are default legal rules truly needed, or can private rules 
adopted by the parties serve the same purpose? 
 
D. Can Institutional and Other Private Rules Serve as a Substitute for 
Default Legal Rules? 
 
One might reasonably question whether there is any need for a set of 
default legal rules to govern arbitration agreements in view of the broad 
and easy availability of institutional and ad hoc rules295 from which parties 
may choose.296 However, the parties may fail to choose any rules. As 
                                                 
292 See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-44 (1995) (explaining 
that the parties may ask the arbitrators to decide this issue just like any other issue they 
might assign to the arbitrators). 
293 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781 n.4 (2010). This issue 
is more fully discussed in Part II.E below. 
294 See supra Part II.A.3.b. 
295 Ad hoc rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, are typically used in the 
absence of institutional administration of the arbitration proceedings. 
296 See, e.g., Rau, supra note 46, at 180 (suggesting, in the context of international 
commercial arbitration, that the vast majority of parties to arbitration agreements 
designate either a set of institutional or ad hoc rules). 
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indicated earlier, the only requirement for an effective arbitration 
agreement is a written agreement to final and binding resolution of a 
defined set of disputes.297 Admittedly, the concern expressed earlier about 
sending negative signals to one’s contracting partner by negotiating over 
dispute resolution298 may not be as acute with respect to selecting a set of 
rules. There is obviously a substantial difference between including fifteen 
pages of detailed arbitration procedures and agreeing to arbitrate under a 
well-known set of institutional rules, which happen themselves to be 
fifteen pages long. However, there may remain other reasons why parties 
fail to include a set of rules in their arbitration agreement. 
The parties may be attempting to save money by omitting any 
institutional reference. In fact, this is exactly why parties sometimes 
choose ad hoc over institutional arbitration.299 However, parties and their 
attorneys may or may not be aware of the existence of ad hoc rules, 
detached from the use of a particular arbitral institution. Thus, a party 
seeking to avoid dispute resolution in court, but hesitant to commit to the 
costs of institutional arbitration and unaware of the existence of ad hoc 
rules, might very well propose arbitration without designating any rules at 
all. Again, it is important to remember that not all contracts that include 
arbitration clauses are drafted by lawyers. Thus, it is quite likely there will 
always be a significant minority300 of arbitration agreements that do not 
include any designation of rules. 
Moreover, there is nothing inconsistent with parallel sets of (1) default 
legal rules and (2) private rules for autonomous incorporation into parties’ 
contracts. By way of comparative example, parties to a sale of goods can 
easily designate INCOTERMS 2000301 (or some other set of trade terms) 
to govern various issues involving shipping and passage of risk (much like 
parties to an arbitration agreement can designate a set of institutional 
rules). However, UCC Article 2 also provides a set of default provisions 
addressing these same issues in the event the parties do not—precisely in 
order to avoid later disputes over omitted terms. 
Lastly, there are certain terms that simply do not work effectively 
based on autonomous choice, whether based on the parties’ own terms or 
their incorporation of a set of arbitration rules, because of inherent flaws 
involving circularity. The most classic example of this problem involves 
                                                 
297 See supra Part I.A. 
298 See supra Part I.A. 
299 MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 330. 
300 For purposes of this Article, the author is willing to concede this is likely a 
minority, though an empirical analysis might be interesting—assuming one could 
actually sample small business agreements, as well as large. 
301 See Incoterms 2010, supra note 67. 
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the doctrine of competence-competence, or the power of an arbitral 
tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction. 
 
E. The Problem with Contractual Competence-Competence 
 
FAA section 4 provides that a court must decide any question of 
whether the parties agreed to arbitration of the dispute in question.302 In 
contrast, most modern arbitration laws grant the arbitral tribunal the power 
to make this determination itself, deciding its own jurisdiction—though 
solely as an initial matter, and fully subject to later (or concurrent)303 court 
review within a limited statutory framework.304 However, one might 
reasonably ask whether, under the FAA, the parties to an arbitration 
agreement could not accomplish a similar result, in effect contractually 
granting the arbitrators the power to decide their own jurisdiction. The 
United States Supreme Court appeared to answer, in First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,305 that parties could do exactly that.306 The 
parties could ask the arbitrators to decide the jurisdictional question307 in 
                                                 
302 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
303 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, at art. 8 (providing for the 
possibility of concurrent jurisdictional determinations by the arbitral tribunal and a proper 
court). 
304 See, e.g., id. at art. 16 (granting the arbitrators the authority to determine their own 
jurisdiction); id. at art. 34, 36 (providing for court review in an action to set aside or 
enforce any award—but only on certain enumerated grounds, one of which is that the 
parties did not agree to arbitration of the dispute in question). While the doctrine of 
competence-competence operates differently in different legal systems as to “timing” (as 
to determinations by courts or arbitrators), the doctrine has gained near universal 
acceptance in international practice, in no small measure due to the influence of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. Barcelo, supra note 241, at 1116-17. While this doctrine allows 
arbitrators to determine their own jurisdiction (either concurrently or prior to a court 
determination), a court will always have the final word on the issue—typically on a de 
novo basis. Id. at 1123. Even French law, which is perhaps the most extreme in granting 
arbitrators the “first” decision regarding jurisdiction. Id. at 1124-27; Richard W. Hulbert, 
Institutional Rules and Arbitral Jurisdiction: When Party Intent is Not “Clear and 
Unmistakable,” 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 545, 565-66 (2009) (providing for subsequent 
judicial review on the question of whether the parties formed a valid arbitration 
agreement).  
305 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
306 See id. at 943. This answer was by no means self-evident, as section 4 might also 
reasonably be read as providing for “mandatory” determination by a competent court on 
the question of whether the parties have validly agreed to arbitrate their dispute. See 
generally Horton, supra note 128. 
307 The Supreme Court refers to this issue as one of “arbitrability.” See First Options 
of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942. However, this Article will use the terms 
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the same manner they could ask the arbitrators to decide any other 
question, such as the merits of their dispute.308 While seemingly a 
straightforward exercise of party autonomy to refer a dispute to 
arbitration, this decision raised a host of questions.309 If the basis of the 
arbitral tribunal’s power to decide its own jurisdiction is no different than 
its power to decide the merits of the parties’ dispute, as the Court 
suggested,310 then the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction is subject to 
review only under the standards of FAA section 10, which does not 
include any reference to the lack of an agreement to arbitrate.311 As such, 
the arbitral tribunal would not only have the power to decide its own 
jurisdiction, but would have the exclusive, and largely non-reviewable, 
power to do so.312 At the very least, the Court had seemingly provided for 
contractually agreed upon competence-competence,313 so long as the 
parties’ intent was “clear and unmistakable.”314 The Court’s opinion in 
First Options undoubtedly led to a number of new drafting ideas with 
respect to arbitration agreements, two of which are particularly relevant 
for our analysis here. 
                                                                                                                         
“jurisdiction” or “competence,” in recognition of their more universal use in arbitration 
practice, globally. Whereas the Supreme Court deems a dispute not “arbitrable” if the 
parties did not agree to arbitration, the more universal practice is to say that an arbitration 
tribunal lacks “jurisdiction” or is not “competent” to decide a dispute if the parties have 
not so agreed. The problem with using this “arbitrability” term with respect to the 
question of whether the parties agreed to arbitration is that it also has many other 
meanings that are quite different and more precise, and its use regarding the agreement to 
arbitrate can lead to unnecessary confusion. See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 
409-10. 
308 First Options, 514 U.S. at 942. 
309 See, e.g., William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: 
What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic? 12 ARB. INT’L 137 
(1996); Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 287 
(1999). 
310 See First Options, 514 U.S. at 943. 
311 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). The only possible provision a court might invoke in 
attempting to review a tribunal’s jurisdictional decision is section 10(4)—however, any 
use of this section for such a purpose is potentially problematic on a much larger scale, as 
more fully explained below. See, e.g., Hulbert, supra note 304, at 546-47 (pointing out 
the potential that the First Options dicta might be read as providing not only for the 
power of the arbitrator to decide the jurisdictional question, but also making such 
decision immune from judicial review). 
312 It was not at all clear that the Court intended such a result, but the Court’s 
language certainly suggested this possibility. 
313 If granted by the parties, the arbitral tribunal would have the power to determine 
its own jurisdiction—i.e., it would possess the competence to determine its own 
competence. 
314 First Options, 514 U.S. at 944. 
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First, a number of United States arbitral institutions have included 
provisions within their domestic rules giving the arbitral tribunal the 
power to determine its own jurisdiction.315 Of course, one might seriously 
question whether an arbitration agreement including a set of rules, within 
which the arbitral tribunal was granted the power to decide its own 
jurisdiction, could possibly amount to “clear and unmistakable” intent to 
consign this issue to the arbitrators.316 However, a substantial majority of 
federal courts dealing with the issue have had little difficulty finding such 
consent in exactly this manner.317 In effect, a contractual version of 
competence-competence is arguably becoming the norm within the United 
States, notwithstanding its omission in the FAA. However, it is worth 
noting the obvious at this stage. The arbitrators’ authority to decide their 
own jurisdiction is based solely on whether the parties agreed to 
arbitration in the first instance. Thus, any grant of such authority is 
arguably fundamentally flawed, as a matter of contractual consent, based 
on its inherent circularity. Perhaps even more importantly, the arbitrators’ 
decision may be virtually unreviewable under FAA section 10, unless 
perhaps the parties also contracted for heightened judicial review. This is 
where the second new idea came into play. In order to alleviate any 
concerns a court might have that an arbitrator’s decision might be 
                                                 
315 See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND 
MEDIATION PROCEDURES 7-8 r.7 (2010) (providing for determination by the arbitral 
tribunal of “the existence or validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a 
part”); JAMS, supra note 61, at 14 r.11(c) (providing for determination by the arbitral 
tribunal of “[j]urisdictional and arbitrability disputes, including disputes over the 
formation, existence, validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement under which 
Arbitration is sought”). The AAA Rule providing for competence-competence was first 
added to its domestic rules in 1999, just four years after the First Options decision. See 
Hulbert, supra note 304, at 563. 
316 If agreeing to a term incorporated in a large body of rules amounts to “clear and 
unmistakable” consent, one might reasonably ask what sort of consent does not satisfy 
this purportedly heightened standard for proving consent. 
317 See, e.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208-09 (2d Cir. 
2005); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmar Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (finding “clear and unmistakable” evidence based on the parties’ agreement to 
arbitration under the AAA Rules, including Rule 7); Mark Berger, Arbitration and 
Arbitrability: Toward an Expectation Model, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 753, 790 (2004); 
Joseph L. Franco, Comment, Casually Finding the Clear and Unmistakable: A Re-
Evaluation of First Options in Light of Recent Lower Court Decisions, 10 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 443, 467-70 (2007). 
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unreviewable, parties inserted contractual provisions for subsequent 
judicial review.318 
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,319 the problems with con-
tractual competence-competence were squarely presented. The Rent-A-
Center contract executed by its employee, Jackson, included a provision in 
the arbitration agreement itself, clearly and unmistakably assigning to the 
arbitral tribunal the authority to decide any and all questions related to its 
jurisdiction, including the question of whether the parties had concluded a 
binding arbitration agreement—and assigning this decisional authority on 
an “exclusive” initial basis, though still subject to later judicial review.320 
Not surprisingly, Rent-A-Center relied on First Options in arguing that 
this provision was fully enforceable and the initial jurisdictional question 
was solely and exclusively for the arbitrators to decide.321 In effect, Rent-
A-Center took the Court at its word in First Options and drafted an 
arbitration agreement seeking to take full advantage of the Court’s dicta. 
Jackson asserted an unconscionability defense to the purported 
arbitration agreement322 and, more importantly for the issue before the 
Court, wanted this issue decided by a court under FAA section 4, and not 
by an arbitrator.323 Jackson pointed out the obvious flaws in First Options 
applied to these circumstances. The arbitrators’ authority to determine 
jurisdiction could not logically rely on the very agreement that Jackson 
was contesting as unconscionable.324 This would amount to a classic 
                                                 
318 At least this was the thinking before the Supreme Court decided Hall Street 
Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
319 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
320 See Brief for the Petitioner at 4-5 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 
(2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 315; Joint Appendix at 29-30 exhibit 
1 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 153. Under the parties’ agreement, this “exclusivity” was purely temporal. The 
arbitral tribunal would have the exclusive opportunity to decide the issue—as an initial 
matter. However, this decision was later to be subject to plenary court review under the 
parties’ agreement. Id. As more fully explained below, the effect of the Court’s decision 
in Hall Street likely renders this provision for plenary review ineffective. 
321 Brief for the Petitioner at 11-14 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) 
(No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 315. 
322 Brief for Respondent at 3-4 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 
09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 260. Jackson asserted that the arbitration 
agreement, specifically, is unconscionable—not the container contract—thereby 
attempting to avoid the doctrine of separability. Id. at 7-8. While an unconscionability 
defense directed at the arbitration agreement itself is far more likely to arise in the 
context of consumer or employee arbitration, other invalidity defenses, such as duress, 
mutual mistake, or fraud, could certainly arise in a commercial context. 
323 Id. at 10-11. 
324 Id. at 10. 
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example of circularity.325 Moreover, surely such circular reasoning could 
not serve as the basis for granting the arbitrators the “exclusive” authority 
to make this determination. 
As presented, this case seemed to require the Court to either: 
(1) follow the First Options dicta to its logical conclusion, enforcing the 
parties’ contractual delegation of competence-competence to the 
arbitrators or (2) explain that the court did not really mean precisely what 
it said in First Options. Interestingly, Jackson suggested a way the Court 
might limit the dicta in First Options, arguing that the Court merely stated 
that the parties could grant the arbitral tribunal the authority to determine 
the “scope” of their arbitration agreement, provided the parties actually 
had an enforceable arbitration agreement in the first instance.326 However, 
Jackson argued, the latter issue was necessarily one for the courts—no 
matter what the parties’ agreement said.327 In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
took the first course and did so, in large part, by relying on the doctrine of 
separability.328 The case nicely illustrates the fundamental problem of 
circularity associated with contractual competence-competence. 
Separability and competence-competence represent distinct, but 
related, doctrines.329 Competence-competence provides the arbitrators 
with the power to decide threshold jurisdictional issues, while separability 
ensures the viability of the tribunal’s decision on the substantive dispute 
assigned to it—assuming it determines that it has jurisdiction to decide the 
substantive dispute in question.  
For all of its continuing controversy,330 the Supreme Court’s original 
decision to embrace separability in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
                                                 
325 In effect, one cannot lift oneself off the floor by pulling on one’s own bootstraps—
no matter how hard one pulls. Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779, 2781 
(2010); Brief for Respondent at 24, 40 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) 
(No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 260. 
326 Brief for Respondent at 39-40 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) 
(No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 260. 
327 Id. at 23-31. 
328 See generally Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2788 (2010) (finding 
that “whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable is itself severable from the 
merits of the underlying dispute, which involves a claim of employment discrimination”) 
(emphasis in original). 
329 Barcelo, supra note 241, at 1116. 
330 See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2785 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (continuing, over 
forty years later, to describe the Court’s decision in Prima Paint as “‘fantastic’” and 
“likely erroneous”); see also Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, 
and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with 
Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 841-48 (2003) (providing a substantial 
critique of the separability doctrine). 
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Manufacturing331 was arguably an unremarkable, and entirely necessary, 
extension by implication of section 2 of the FAA.332 Section 2 makes 
enforceable an agreement to resolve a contractual dispute by arbitration, 
and parties subject to contractual claims will often raise traditional con-
tract validity defenses such as duress, mistake, fraud, or unconscionability. 
The defenses are often raised as a matter of course, and they are also 
frequently intertwined with the merits of the dispute referred to arbitration. 
Thus, if the arbitral tribunal could not effectively decide these questions, 
the entire arbitral process would almost certainly be subject to lengthy 
delays, and the agreement to arbitrate would often be rendered 
ineffective.333   
Two simple examples illustrate the importance of the doctrine of 
separability to an effective arbitration regime. In each case, A brings an 
action against B for breach of a contract that includes an arbitration 
agreement. B raises a defense of mutual mistake, asserting that the 
contract is therefore voidable.334 Under the doctrine of separability, the 
arbitral tribunal is empowered to decide this defense, without any effect on 
the arbitration clause contained within the potentially voidable main 
contract. Without separability, in example one, a court might decide this 
defense. However, this would essentially resolve this particular case, and 
the parties would be deprived of their contractual agreement to arbitrate 
the dispute. Still without separability, in example two, an arbitrator might 
go ahead and try to decide the parties’ dispute. However, the arbitrator 
could only issue an enforceable, preclusive decision in one direction—that 
of denying B’s defense. If the arbitrator decided in favor of the defense, he 
or she would also necessarily have to acknowledge the lack of any 
remaining jurisdiction to do anything but send the parties away without 
resolving their dispute. Separability, of course, resolves this very 
important practical problem—albeit with an admitted bit of theoretical 
“sleight of hand”—by allowing the arbitrator to decide the parties’ 
dispute, including any invalidity defense involving the main contract and 
to do so in favor of either party in an enforceable, preclusive award.335 
In Rent-A-Center, the parties’ arguments largely centered over the 
interpretation of the First Options dicta: was “delegation” largely limited 
to scope (or, perhaps, other similar issues) or did “delegation” include the 
question of whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate anything at all? The 
                                                 
331 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
332 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
333 See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 368-71. 
334 For the sake of clarity and simplicity, this is the only issue in this set of 
hypotheticals.  
335 See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 368-71. 
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dissent suggests that the majority announced a rule not advocated by either 
party,336 and at least one commentator seems to agree.337 However, the 
majority’s decision in Rent-A-Center is arguably nothing more than an 
inevitable result of a literal reading of First Options taken to its logical 
conclusion, including the necessary application of the doctrine of 
separability. 
In First Options, the Court stated that the parties could delegate 
questions regarding jurisdiction (or, in the Court’s vernacular, 
“arbitrability”) to the arbitrator, including the questions of whether the 
parties had agreed to arbitration at all or whether the dispute in question 
fell within the scope of that agreement.338 In doing so, the Court explained 
that the parties’ agreement to delegate these jurisdictional decisions to the 
arbitrator was the equivalent of an agreement to delegate decisions 
regarding their dispute on the merits, and was subject to the same standard 
of review as a decision on the merits—that contained in section 10 of the 
FAA.339 
Taken at face value, the dicta from First Options said, quite clearly, 
that the parties could delegate jurisdictional decisions to the arbitrator, 
whose decision on the issue would be equally final to that of a decision on 
the merits—as long as this delegation is “clear and unmistakable.”340 
Thus, unless the Court was prepared to ignore or, in some way, “refine” its 
earlier First Options dicta, its decision in Rent-A-Center was virtually a 
foregone conclusion; the question of whether Jackson’s agreement to 
arbitrate might be unconscionable and, therefore, invalid had been “clearly 
and unmistakably” delegated to the arbitrator. 
What apparently surprised some,341 including the dissenters,342 was the 
majority’s application of the doctrine of separability under these 
circumstances. However, if the parties’ delegation of the question of 
jurisdiction to the arbitrator is no different from their “delegation” of their 
dispute on the merits, then the majority’s approach seems quite logical. 
The “delegation provision” is separable from the arbitration agreement in 
                                                 
336 See Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2782 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
337 See Cross, supra note 15.  
338 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-45 (1995); see also 
Barcelo, supra note 241, at 1133 (explaining the rebuttable presumption against the 
former and contrasting it with the presumption in favor of the arbitrator’s power to 
determine the latter). 
339 First Options, 514 U.S. at 943 (1995). 
340 Id. at 944. 
341 See, e.g., Cross, supra note 15. 
342 See Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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exactly the same manner that the arbitration agreement is separable from 
the main contract, of which it often forms a part.343 Moreover, this 
application of the doctrine of separability is fully consistent with its 
purpose, as explained above. Absent the doctrine of separability, the 
arbitrator would be empowered only to make a positive decision on 
jurisdiction pursuant to the “delegation” clause, because a negative 
decision would deprive the arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction on the 
“delegation” question, thereby negating the preclusive effect of any 
decision. 
The problem with the Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center does not lie in 
its application of separability in that case. Instead, the problem arises from 
the First Options dicta and the entire notion of contractual competence-
competence, which the majority in Rent-A-Center simply applied as 
written. 
As mentioned earlier, the arbitration agreement at issue in Rent-A-
Center included a provision for expanded judicial review of any decision 
of the arbitrators.344 However, this provision is almost certainly ineffective 
today based on the Court’s decision in Hall Street, strictly limiting judicial 
review to the very narrow grounds provided in FAA section 10.345 Thus, if 
Rent-A-Center and Hall Street are read together, as written, they clarify 
that the arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction will be final, subject only to 
review under section 10, which does not include any review of whether 
the parties concluded a valid arbitration agreement.346 The arbitrator’s 
decision is, essentially, unreviewable—at any stage—under the Court’s 
interpretation of contractual competence-competence.347 
                                                 
343 Id. at 2777-79. 
344 Id. at 2781. 
345 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
346 Of course, there would be no reason to provide for such review if section 4 
provided for mandatory jurisdictional decisions by a court in the first instance. See 
Horton, supra note 128, at 4-6 (explaining the inherent inconsistency in the Court’s 
treatment of section 10 as mandatory and exclusive, while treating section 4 as a default 
rule subject to the parties’ contrary agreement). 
347 Admittedly, it is possible that “manifest disregard” has, in some form, survived 
Hall Street. See Nicholas R. Weiskopf & Matthew S. Mulqueen, Hall Street, Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, and Federal Preemption, 29 REV. LITIG. 361, 367-71 (2010) 
(providing, perhaps, some basis for review of a particularly egregious jurisdictional 
decision). It is also possible that a court might resort to section 10(4), providing for 
review and setting aside of an award in which the arbitrators “exceeded their powers, or 
so imperfectly executed them ….” However, the use of this provision, like the “manifest 
disregard” standard is fraught with the potential to undermine the finality of awards on 
the merits of an arbitral dispute, because the Court has said that “delegation” of the 
jurisdictional question is governed by exactly the same legal principles as an agreement 
to arbitrate the merits of the parties’ contract dispute. 
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Taken at face value, this result seems bizarre, though such a 
perspective is admittedly affected by one’s own subjective lens. However, 
the result is objectively and quite clearly inconsistent with the standards 
for enforcement of international arbitration awards under the New York 
Convention. The Convention provides for recognition of arbitration 
agreements, unless a court finds “said agreement is null and void,”348 and 
provides for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, subject to an 
exception where a court finds the parties’ “[arbitration] agreement is not 
valid.”349 As explained in Part II.A.3.a, the New York Convention applies 
to a variety of non-domestic agreements and awards and is also the legal 
instrument through which awards rendered in the U.S. are typically 
enforced abroad.350 This inconsistency between FAA section 10 and the 
New York Convention creates a very real possibility that an award that is 
not subject to “vacation” under section 10 might nonetheless be 
unenforceable under the New York Convention. Such inconsistencies can 
easily be avoided by simply ensuring the statutory grounds for vacation of 
an award mirror those for non-enforcement, and also reflect those for 
judicial recognition of an arbitration agreement351—an approach taken in 
the vast majority of modern arbitration statutes, but largely ignored in the 
implementation of the New York and Panama conventions under the FAA. 
The purpose of an arbitration agreement is to avoid court proceedings 
in resolving any dispute arising from the parties’ commercial relationship. 
An arbitrator’s decision on such issues is necessarily protected from 
subsequent scrutiny in order to give effect to the parties’ bargain for an 
efficient and final resolution of their dispute—without going to court. 
However, these same principles are misplaced when the issue is whether 
the parties ever agreed in the first instance to arbitrate anything. In this 
latter case, a court must—at some point—have an opportunity to 
determine whether the parties in fact gave up their right to judicial 
process. The statutory doctrine of competence-competence provides for 
efficiency in allowing an arbitrator to make this determination, while also 
ensuring the availability of meaningful judicial review at some point in the 
process. The same cannot be accomplished through the Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
348 New York Convention, supra note 6, at art. II(3). 
349 Id., art. V(1)(a). These same issues would arise with enforcement of an award 
under the Panama Convention.  
350 See supra Part II.A.3.a. 
351 See supra note 198. 
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efforts to create a contractual form of competence-competence—at least 
not as currently articulated.352 
Any attempt to address competence-competence through arbitral rules 
is subject to the same deficiencies as an express agreement by the parties. 
Even if sufficient to constitute “clear and unmistakable” consent, the 
effect of such consent amounts to a final and absolute delegation of the 
issue, without meaningful judicial review. Nor can state law effectively 
provide for competence-competence, inasmuch as the issue is 
unequivocally one governed by “‘substantive federal arbitration law.’”353 
The doctrine of competence-competence is central to modern com- 
mercial arbitration and is arguably an absolute necessity for any modern 
statute. It cannot be effectively invoked by contract. Instead, an effective 
competence-competence regime must be a part of the statutory 
background,354 invoked not by the terms of the parties’ disputed 
arbitration agreement, but by the very existence of such a dispute brought 
to the attention of the arbitral tribunal. It must also be subject to 
meaningful judicial review, whatever the timing of such review. Many 
important arbitral doctrines can be invoked by either private rules or by 
the law governing the arbitration. However, competence-competence must 
come from the underlying legal regime. Neither party autonomy, nor 
private rules, nor state arbitration law can reasonably serve as a substitute. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The time has come to jettison the aged and arcane U.S. Federal 
Arbitration Act. It has fully served its original purpose of making 
arbitration agreements enforceable355 and now serves only as a giant 
                                                 
352 To the author’s knowledge, there is only a single historical example of such a 
purely contractual doctrine of competence-competence, which was also arguably absolute 
and unreviewable. This was the old view of “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” that developed for 
a period under German law, but has since been abandoned in favor of the more modern 
statutory approach. Gerold Zeiler & Katarina Hruskovicova, The Principle of Kompetenz 
Kompetenz According to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, in The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: 25 
Years 109, 109 (Assoc. for Int’l Arb., eds., 2010). 
353 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781 n.4 (2010). 
354 See Barcelo, supra note 241, at 1136 (suggesting statutory reform of U.S. law as 
the most reasonable method for developing a robust and effective competence-
competence doctrine in this country). While Professor Barcelo also notes that even 
statutory competence-competence involves a degree of “bootstrapping” or circularity, id. 
at 1132, this particular exercise in circularity is at least fully subject to later judicial 
review. 
355 In fact, some might even say it has served this purpose too well. 
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“black hole” into which the courts pour more and more decisions and into 
which parties to arbitration agreements—agreements expressly intended to 
avoid courts—pour more and more of their money. The only fully 
functional way to provide an effective set of default rules for arbitration 
agreements is to do so with a new, comprehensive, modern arbitration 
statute, and the most efficient way to do this is with a single statute 
governing all commercial arbitration—whether domestic or 
international—that fully comports with modern global standards.356 This is 
not to suggest that Congress should simply adopt, in total, any particular 
model or national law, but simply that the time has come to draft a modern 
statute to govern arbitration in the United States, and we can learn much 
from those who have already considered and adopted such statutes. 
In commenting on a series of conference presentations, Professor 
Carbonneau recently observed that the presentations on international 
commercial arbitration were generally less controversial and more cogent 
than those on domestic arbitration, which had focused on disparate party 
arbitration—the most controversial aspect of U.S. arbitration law.357 He 
further noted that “arbitration in the trans-border context has thus far 
escaped being mauled by the claws of politicalization [and] is vital to 
global commerce ….”358 If we can somehow separate commercial, 
business-to-business arbitration—both domestic and international—from 
the political morass of disparate party arbitration,359 then we should be 
able to find common ground in developing and adopting a modern federal 
arbitration statute to govern this dispute resolution mechanism so vital to 
U.S. commerce—both at home and abroad. 
                                                 
356 For two examples of such a statute, one could look to the German Arbitration Act 
of 1998 (an almost complete adoption of the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law), 
or the English Arbitration Act of 1996 (a unique comprehensive statute). See sources 
cited supra note 20. 
357 Carbonneau, supra note 15, at 417-18. 
358 Id. 
359 See Stipanowich, supra note 15, at 57 (pointing out the significant contextual 
differences involved in legislation governing business-to-business arbitration, as 
compared to consumer and employee arbitration). The U.S. should follow the basic 
European approach and separately regulate consumer and individual employment 
arbitration, limiting each to ex post agreements to arbitrate. However, the purposes of this 
Article could be served by any means of separating the law governing commercial, 
business-to-business arbitration from that governing consumer and individual employee 
arbitration. 
